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Human errors are an expected result of operations performed by individuals and 
frequently lead to accidents and other catastrophic events.  The problem is that the 
current process used to investigate and mitigate human errors in the biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing industries is not effective, as it does not include the effects of human 
factors found to be effective in aviation and nuclear power organizations.  The human 
factors and classification system (HFACS) was created for the investigations of accidents 
using the Swiss cheese model of accident causation as a theoretical framework.  The 
purpose of this quantitative, inter-rater reliability study was to demonstrate the utility of 
the HFACS for human error investigations in the biopharmaceutical industry.  The 
research questions focused on the level of agreement between independent raters using 
HFACS, as well as the difference in the level of agreement across different areas of 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes.  In a fully crossed design, raters evaluated a 
stratified sample of 161 incident records further analyzed using Cohen’s kappa, 
percentage agreement, and a 1-way analysis of variance test with Scheffe post hoc tests.  
Study results indicated the reliability of the modified HFACS taxonomy, which included 
no statistical difference (p < .05) with substantial Cohen’s kappa values of .66.  The 
social benefit of this study may stem from biopharmaceutical manufacturers using these 
findings to decrease human errors, improve the safety and reliability of their processes, 
decrease manufacturing costs, and support the development of drugs to address the unmet 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Human errors are an expectation in operations performed by individuals.  The 
general perception is that people are erratic and unreliable; therefore, they are the 
considered as the primary cause of errors and accidents (Dekker, 2006).  Critical or 
complex processes that involve humans require special attention to prevent errors that 
will lead to accidents, and neglecting the vulnerability created by humans in execution 
may lead to catastrophic results.   
Historically, catastrophic events in the aviation and nuclear power fields 
stimulated substantial research to control human errors.  Accordingly, various models for 
accident investigations provide a framework for human investigation techniques (Berry, 
Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2010).  With the aid of human investigation frameworks, 
practitioners have been able to improve the effectiveness of error investigations.  The 
immediate result of improved investigational analysis leads to improved operations.   
The aviation and nuclear power plant industries have experienced a reduction in 
accidents caused by human errors because of the implementation of the findings from the 
investigative tools and techniques developed to identify the causal factors.  Studies 
conducted in the aviation and nuclear power industries have had a significant 
improvement in safety through the reduction of human errors in their operations (Liu, 
Nickens, Leon, & Boquet, 2013; Shappell et al., 2007; Vaughuen & Muschara, 2011).  
Based on past investigations into aviation and nuclear power accidents, the general 
perception of individuals as the primary cause for human error is misleading.  Experts 
must consider many elements when evaluating the occurrence of human error, as front-
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line operators are only part of the whole operating system.  Human error investigation 
models indicate that errors are not random occurrences but rather the result of systemic, 
connected factors. 
Leaders of organizations outside the aviation and nuclear power industries have 
applied human error models to investigate accidents.  Researchers have conducted studies 
to mitigate the catastrophic results of accidents in maritime, railroad, and mining 
organizations, but those studies remain limited, as researchers have not investigated the 
areas of error-contributing factors in detail (Berry et al., 2010).  A gap exists in 
determining the preempting and causal factors of human errors in executing a sequence 
of activities.  Health care also has a gap in human error investigations, which represents a 
risk to individuals.   
In the field of health care, for instance, although the catastrophic outcomes of 
accidents and errors are not as obvious as are those of a plane crash, they do represent a 
significant predicament for society.  According to researchers at the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (2013), unintentional accidents in operations pertinent to 
health care settings in 2010 represented the fifth leading cause of death in the United 
States.  Accordingly, some researchers have shown that the human error models used in 
aviation and nuclear power organizations may be appropriate in health care (ElBardissi, 
Wiegmann, Dearani, Daly, & Sundt, 2007).  The same models also apply to organizations 




Biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes have complex operations, and 
although errors are not as disastrous, they represent a considerable burden to health care.  
Human errors have caused significant deviations, resulting in product quality issues as 
well as costly process interruptions (Clarke, 2009).  Such process disruptions have 
delayed the entry of new drugs into the market, increased the cost of drugs, and 
contributed to the lack of product availability and affordability to the public. Although 
rare, some drugs incorrectly prepared or developed have led to fatalities.  Therefore, the 
biopharmaceutical industry should benefit from better investigative tools to reduce and 
prevent these errors. 
In this study, I evaluated the use of the human factors analysis and classification 
system (HFACS) taxonomy to assess how it may affect the current understanding of 
human errors in biopharmaceutical manufacturing operations and used the data obtained 
to explain how to implement human factor tools in these investigations.  A reduction in 
human error in biopharmaceutical operations may improve reliability while minimizing 
the associated adverse effects.  The elements of the study, the background, problem 
statement, purpose, nature, research questions and hypotheses, theoretical framework, 
significance, definitions of terms, assumptions and limitations, and concluding summary 
are in Chapter 1. 
Background of the Study 
Human errors are some of the most frequently identified causes of accidents by 
investigators.  For example, accident investigators have counted human errors as the root 
cause of 70% of most aviation accidents (Liu et al., 2013; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  
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Similarly, leaders in multiple industries attribute human errors as the main cause of 
accidents and production losses (Celik & Cebi, 2009; Vaughuen & Muschara, 2011; 
Wachter & Yorio, 2013).  To address these issues, the authors of many studies in the 
literature of human error have attempted to identify methods to pinpoint the root cause of 
such human errors that are more efficient.  Researchers studied how to identify the 
precursors of errors considering the elements around human factors, organizational and 
system-related failures (Wachter & Yorio, 2013).  Researchers also examined human 
performance elements that could pinpoint active errors as well as error precursors 
(Wachter & Yorio, 2013).  Although human factor models were originally for the 
aviation industry, the biopharmaceutical manufacturing field can benefit from such 
systems as well. 
The manufacturing processes for pharmaceutical products, either typical 
methodologies or complicated processes such as biotechnology, are also vulnerable to 
human errors.  As a result, experts at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA, 
2003) recognized human errors as outcomes manufacturers should prevent.  Additionally, 
product evaluators at the FDA recognized that human errors are more impactful to public 
safety than product defects (FDA, 2011).  Although the costs associated with 
manufacturing these products are high, manufacturers cannot overlook quality. 
All production costs, including losses, have a direct impact on the quality and 
effectiveness of the production activities, and leaders in manufacturing industries 
frequently try to control the overall costs of their operations.  According to Clarke (2009), 
the losses attributed to human errors, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry, cost 
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billions of dollars every year.  Human errors also have a negative impact on access to 
medicines in countries in which affordability is a challenge.  Therefore, human errors 
represent an important component of the increased production costs due to product, 
materials, and time-associated waste. 
However, the leaders of many companies attribute lack of training to be a main 
cause for human error and drive corrective and preventative actions toward that area.  
The corrective actions to address such human errors mainly relate to retraining labor not 
human factors (Poska, 2010).  As a result, members of the manufacturing industry are 
unable to determine the true root cause of human errors (Clarke, 2009; Poska, 2010).  
Because of the significant effect of human errors on the manufacturing industry, it was 
imperative to study what contributes to causing them. 
Although researchers have focused on this issue, they have recognized human 
performance is the way company leaders organize working operations.  According to 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003), multiple layers of an organization can lead to human 
errors.  Such organizational tiers can include errors caused by structures other than 
workers, and latent causes include leadership and even organizational or functional 
structures (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), which leads to the notion that the cause of most 
human errors is a sequence of events rather than a single cause.  The majority of incidents 
are the direct result of humans performing the function, and the remainder may be the 
result of a combination of further conditions of leadership but also specific conditions 
directly attributed to supervisors’ organization of activities or even higher organizational 
demands indirectly affecting operators.  Therefore, the best alternative to prevent workers 
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from making errors is to identify all the potential precursors and mitigate their effects on 
the operators.   
In many instances, identifying and preventing errors is challenging, primarily 
because the problem is even more difficult to correct when people expect it, especially 
when humans conduct activities.  A common perception is that errors are intrinsic to 
operations involving humans and therefore an expected outcome of the operations 
(Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johannesen, & Sarter, 2010).  The study of human error from the 
perspective of learning from past issues is equally problematic due to the negative 
connotations associated with the performance of these types of studies.  Although 
learning from mistakes seems to be wise, for some organizational leaders it is a difficult 
task because the origin of the knowledge is a negative event.  Not all leaders in industries 
agree with this line of thinking. 
Investigators in the aviation and nuclear power industries, for instance, have 
studied the human error phenomenon to decrease accidents and improve the safety of 
their operations.  The studies of human error conducted by researchers for nuclear power 
and aviation organizations have reduced the adverse effect of such accidents (Stanton et 
al., 2013).  Accordingly, accident investigators in the aviation industry have developed 
tools specifically for investigating accidents and incidents caused by human error.  
Investigators of the aviation and nuclear industries, driven by the urgency of the 
catastrophic results of accidents in their domain, have created models that study human 
elements beyond skills and training.  In particular, accident investigators in the aviation 
industry developed HFACS to investigate the latent causes of accidents. 
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The HFACS is a hierarchical taxonomy developed to conduct causal factors 
analysis in aviation accidents.  Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) developed the HFACS 
taxonomy to investigate military aviation accidents by subdividing causal factors into 
categories.  The arrangement of the HFACS taxonomy of causal factors of errors into 
four hierarchical categories from bottom to higher order (organizational influences, 
unsafe supervision, and preconditions for unsafe acts and unsafe acts) is in Figure 1.  
Aviation accident investigators use the taxonomy to aid in analyzing accidents using the 
main causal factors in each category (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  The categories and 
codes of factors allowed the investigators to look for causes beyond the pilot or operators.  
The resulting investigations encompassed root cause detection at deeper levels and 





Figure 1.  The HFACS.  From A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident Analysis 
(p. 71), by D. A. Wiegmann & S. A. Shappell, 2003, Burlington, VT: Ashgate.  
Copyright 2003 by Douglas A. Wiegmann and Scott A. Shappell.  Adapted with 
permission. 
 
The effectiveness of investigators using HFACS in aviation led to increased 
interest in other domains.  Researchers demonstrated that investigators could effectively 
use HFACS in other industries to help in the investigations of accidents (Shappell et al., 
2007).  Accidents attributed to human error have been an area of concern globally, and 
HFACS has become a tool for reducing these issues.  For instance, HFACS-derived 
methodology was suitable to analyze human error influences and to prevent these causes 
from recurring in merchant shipping accidents (Celik & Cebi, 2009; Xi, Chen, Fang, & 
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Hu, 2010).  Furthermore, Celik and Cebi proposed modifications to the HFACS taxonomy 
that involved integrating a statistical model that provides a quantitative analysis of 
factors.  The proposal for applying it to maritime accident investigations and enabling its 
quantitative elements was innovative.  Although this was a significant step in maritime, 
as well as in other domains, the biopharmaceutical industry is different.  
The use of human factors in pharmaceutical manufacturing organizations to 
investigate error is not widespread.  Limited research exists on human error phenomena 
in pharmaceutical manufacturing organizations due to confidentiality concerns and a 
general unwillingness to share sensitive production information (Rodchua, 2009).  In 
addition, the level of complexity and variety of pharmaceutical manufacturing processes 
make it difficult to assess human factor conditions during the operations.  Another cause 
of this problem can be a lack of understanding by all levels of operations to appreciate the 
need to learn from previous mistakes to prevent recurrence.  The negative implication of 
errors prevents organizational leaders from expanding the knowledge of such situations 
from an affirmative learning viewpoint (Edmonson, 2011).  Further, the prevalence of 
human error may have been an expected development, as the leaders in the 
pharmaceutical industry did not face regulatory requirements to advance their 
understanding of the phenomena from the perspective of human factors until recently 
(FDA, 2011).  The lack of regulatory oversight was only one reason for the stunted 
research attempts. 
Another factor limiting research on error in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
is the lack of data available during investigations regarding the human factors conditions 
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of the events.  As a result, complete databases with specific and detailed human error 
information are lacking the required details for pharmaceutical industries (Anand et al., 
2006).  The focus and interest of the leaders of each company are on generalizing during 
human error investigations (Anand et al., 2006).  The available research is limited mainly 
due to the multitude of industrial applications as well as the proprietary concerns around 
the technological processes, which make it difficult to produce studies that yield the 
information required in the subject of human factors in error investigations.  All these 
complications have prevented the development of human factors in error investigations in 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing. 
Problem Statement 
Human error is a routine part of life, and people will likely always be the cause of 
errors.  The problem studied was that the current process used to investigate and mitigate 
human errors in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industries is not effective, as it 
does not include the effects of human factors that have been effective in aviation and 
nuclear power organizations.  The effect of human error is substantial; human error is a 
principal cause of accidents and has vast and potentially negative consequences in 
various industries, including aviation, nuclear power, transportation, and health care 
(Berry et al., 2010).  Thus, organizational leaders devote a great deal of time and 
resources to reducing or preventing errors that may lead to the loss of resources, property, 
and even lives. 
Companies involved in biopharmaceutical product manufacturing are subject to 
the adverse effect of human errors.  For instance, FDA representatives established that 
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human error is a problem for drug manufacturing companies as well as for patients and 
users of their products, thereby serving as a risk to the public (FDA, 2003).  The leaders 
of the organizations have the responsibility to protect the safety and efficacy of the 
products that the public receives (FDA, 2003).  In addition, costs associated with human 
error in the biopharmaceutical industry include the health and quality of life of patients 
and increased cost and demand that negatively affect the health care cost burden carried 
by the population (Glavin, 2010).  For these reasons, it is critical for researchers to 
pinpoint the causes of human error in the biopharmaceutical industry.  Although 
researchers have not systematically investigated human error in biopharmaceutical 
engineering, industry leaders can benefit from research conducted in the field of aviation. 
Researchers in the aviation industry have studied the phenomenon of human error 
in depth to reduce accidents and increase operational safety.  Scholars have used the 
HFACS to investigate the causes of accidents (Shappell et al., 2007), thereby reducing 
accidents caused by human error.  As a result of the HFACS, the rate of accidents has not 
increased since 2000, despite an exponential increase in the number of flights (Pasztor, 
2012).  Other researchers have shown the extended applicability of the HFACS to other 
types of industries for investigating accidents (Berry et al., 2010; Chauvin, Lardjane, 
Morel, Clostermann, & Langard, 2013; Shappell et al., 2007).  My aim in undertaking 
this quantitative study was to evaluate the applicability of the classification segment of 
the HFACS to studying human error in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry 
and to determine how to reduce or eliminate the errors.   
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the utility of the HFACS to 
the investigation of human error and deviations in the biopharmaceutical industry to 
identify the factors that lead to human error in biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
operations.  The results may help to improve organizational compliance with regulatory 
agencies by providing a more consistent system to determine the root causes of human 
error.  Better root cause determination may result in more standard and effective 
corrective and preventive actions determination.  
In this study, I used a taxonomy based on the attributes of the HFACS to evaluate 
data from process-deviation investigations in which the examiners considered human 
errors the root cause.  I used the data to examine the reliability of the modified HFACS 
taxonomy in evaluating the causal attributes driving the occurrence of human error in 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes.  Through the study, I provided information 
to assess the reliability of the modified HFACS taxonomy to investigate human errors in 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing operations.  The variables measured in the study were 
the HFACS 18 human factors in the causal categories of task/act, preconditions, 
leadership/supervisor, and organizational influences.  Specifically the variables measured 
were the following causal factors: resource management, organizational climate, 
organizational processes, inadequate supervision, planned activities, failed to correct the 
problem, rules and regulations violations, physical environment, technological 
environment, adverse mental state, psychological state, physical/mental limitations, 
teamwork, personal readiness, knowledge-based errors, skill-based errors, routine 
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violations, and exceptional violations.  Further descriptions of the variables of the study 
are in Chapter 3.   
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
Substantial research in the literature extends the applicability of the HFACS to 
industries other than aviation for aiding in the investigation of accidents.  Researchers 
have studied the utility of the HFACS in the maritime, mining, nursing, and surgery 
industries, among others (Shappell et al., 2007).  In this study, I evaluated the extent of 
the reliability of the HFACS taxonomy to the investigation of human error in 
pharmaceutical manufacturing environments.  The research questions were as follows: 
RQ1: What is the level of agreement (Cohen’s kappa) between the two 
independent raters using the revised version of the HFACS taxonomy in 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes?  
RQ2: What is the difference in the level of agreement (Cohen’s kappa) across 
different areas (operational services, upstream manufacturing, and 
downstream manufacturing) between raters using the revised version of the 
HFACS taxonomy in biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes?  
The hypotheses for the research questions were as follows: 
H10: The overall Cohen’s kappa statistic between the two independent raters will 
not be substantial (κ < .61) based on the criteria set by Landis and Koch 
(1977). 
H1a: The overall Cohen’s kappa statistic between the two independent raters will 
be substantial (κ > .60) based on the criteria set by Landis and Koch (1977). 
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H20: There are no significant differences between average Cohen’s kappa 
statistics across the operational services, upstream manufacturing, and 
downstream manufacturing areas. 
H2a: There are significant differences between average Cohen’s kappa statistics 
across the operational services, upstream manufacturing, and downstream 
manufacturing areas. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of the study was using the HFACS to determine and 
evaluate human error.  The basis of the study of human error is human factor theory, 
which researchers developed within the nuclear industry and that allows for the 
evaluation of deviations and errors to make operations safer.  Investigators in the aviation 
industry use human factor theory to evaluate their accidents (Reason, 1990).  Human 
factor theories incorporate elements of organizational theories and their effects on 
examining the behaviors and actions causing human error.  Investigators have 
incorporated those elements in various models in an approach to accident investigation. 
Among the concepts developed for the approach to accident causation, or the 
Swiss cheese framework, was the idea that employees present the activities in productive 
systems in layers representing preconditions.  In developing the Swiss cheese framework, 
Reason (1990) divided the actions that can cause an accident into active and latent 
conditions.  Accidents occur when a layer breaks down or when systems have holes, thus 
causing degradations in the productive system.  The Swiss cheese framework has since 
become a basis for other models and taxonomies. 
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The Swiss cheese framework is the basis of the HFACS.  Reason’s (1990) theory 
provided a definition for failures in productive systems.  The HFACS further divided 
latent and active failures into causal factors, including categories and subcategories that 
examiners could use to determine the contributing factors in accident investigations 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  Examiners used the HFACS taxonomy effectively to 
investigate the causes of aviation accidents (Shappell et al., 2007).  Researchers have 
since expanded this framework to other areas so they could use the model to investigate 
the associations between contributing factors and errors.  Investigators may use those 
associations of contributing factors to determine the feasibility of the HFACS in 
investigating errors in other organizations. 
In this study, I provided information regarding the utility of the HFACS 
theoretical concepts in the investigation of human error during the execution of 
production processes in manufacturing biopharmaceutical products.  Through the 
HFACS, information regarding contributing factors in error investigations may be 
available, which may allow the treatment of error investigations from a higher causal 
perspective.  I also examined the utility of the HFACS by determining how reliable and 
comprehensive the taxonomy is when used to investigate the causes of human error in 
different biopharmaceutical settings and to consider how they conform to the theories of 
human factors. 
Nature of the Study 
The focus of this quantitative study was to determine the utility of the HFACS for 
conducting human error investigations in biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes by 
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examining the validity of the taxonomy through its reliability.  In this study, I modified 
the HFACS taxonomy to meet the needs of the biopharmaceutical manufacturing process.  
Through this quantitative interrater reliability study, I evaluated the validity of the 
modified HFACS for conducting investigations in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
process by examining the reliability of the taxonomy through determining the level of 
agreement among independent raters or interrater reliability.   
The design was adequate for this study because the data provided information 
regarding the validity of the method to the extent that it produced the results expected.  In 
this study, the measurement of the reliability among coders provided information 
regarding the utility of the HFACS for classifying human error in the biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing industry.  The study included information regarding the degree of 
reliability on how different investigators can classify such errors from process deviation 
investigations of the biotechnology industry.   
Studies in the literature include various approaches to examine the utility of 
human error taxonomies.  For instance, Olsen (2013) showed how researchers conducted 
a variety of studies to demonstrate the reliability of the techniques used.  The main 
factors considered in designing the reliability studies included the aim of the study, 
consideration and identification of factors, type of reports, and characteristics of the raters 
or coders (Olsen, 2013).  To determine the methodology for the study, I considered 
similar factors based on the available literature.   
In determining the methodology for the study, I considered and rejected several 
alternatives.  For instance, the aim of the study was to determine the utility of an 
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established technique (HFACS) as well as the availability of investigation data.  In this 
case, the data from the investigations were readily available, and the professionals in the 
field of biopharmaceutical incident investigations were homogeneous, as the level of 
training was similar.  Therefore, there was no need to assess the reliability between 
various professions of participants as well as training level.  The study involved assessing 
the level of agreement when participant investigators with the same level of HFACS 
training analyzed the same incident information independently.   
The main measure of the validity of HFACS used in biopharmaceutical 
investigations was the level of agreement between raters.  In this study, the analysis tool 
was Cohen’s kappa.  Cohen’s kappa provides for a determination of agreement between 
raters, adjusting for agreement that will occur only by chance (Raheja & Gullo, 2012).  
Kappa is the most used tool for reliability in studies using the HFACS (Olsen, 2013; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  Although there is no difference between the particular 
characteristics of the reliability studies, the common factors are training, materials, and 
data to analyze.  The majority of the studies establish a requirement of training hours for 
the raters that fluctuate from a few hours to up to 5 days, as well as data in the form of 
previous investigations (Olsen, 2013).  The selected methodology for assessing the 
HFACS reliability included specific training, definitions of codes, and data from previous 
investigations.  The methodology of reliability aligned with the most common studies 




Definition of Terms 
The terms and definitions used in the study are as follows: 
Action: The voluntary or deliberate performance of an act by a human at the 
interface between another human, system, machine, or environment (Hansen, 2006). 
Biopharmaceuticals: Pharmaceutical drugs produced by using biotechnological 
recombinant manufacturing processes (Kayser & Warzecha, 2012). 
Codes: Error factors presented in taxonomy for classifications.  Investigators use 
the 18 factors in the HFACS as codes to determine the causal factors of investigations 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Error precursors: Preexisting conditions at a job area that increase the likelihood 
of human error during actions or operations (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008a). 
Event: An incident caused by failures (Shappell et al., 2007). In the 
biopharmaceutical industry are classified as any non-conformance of processes and 
procedures. 
Failures: Human, environmental, or equipment factors that cause a deviation 
from established procedures (Shappell et al., 2007). 
Human error or failure: State or condition of being wrong in conduct or judgment 
and causing a failure in the actions to produce or achieve the expected result (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2008a). 
Human factors: Causal preconditions defining elements that can lead to human 
error (Shappell et al., 2007). 
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Human performance: A function of the balance between the capability of the 
individual carrying out the task and its demands (Whittingham, 2004). 
Latent conditions: Deficiencies in management control processes or values that 
are not apparent but create workplace conditions promoting errors (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2008a). 
Near system event: Any unplanned, unforeseen occurrence that results from a 
failure of the system but that does not result in higher or catastrophic consequences (e.g., 
death, losses, or delays; U.S. Department of Energy, 2008b). 
Overall Cohen’s kappa statistic for interrater reliability: The average kappa 
statistic across all the individual kappa statistics derived from each of the individual 
factor ratings (Hanneman, Augustine, & Riddle, 2012). 
Tasks: The mental, physical, or team activities required performing a procedure 
(U.S. Department of Energy, 2008b). 
Validity: How well the HFACS measurements are in practicality when used for 
biopharmaceutical investigations.  The focus of determining the validity of a framework 
was on the reliability of the users identifying causal factors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003). 
Violation: Procedural or protocol deviation that is deliberate and not necessarily 
derived to generate an adverse effect.  A violation could be a routine shortcut that can be 




I made various assumptions in this study and methodology.  The first assumption 
was that I would have access to confidential data from the human error investigations of a 
biopharmaceutical company that will include sufficient information to perform the 
HFACS analysis.  The second assumption was that the data from such investigations 
existed in a current database and will be able to be queried according to human errors by 
functional area.  Finally, I assumed that I would be able to obtain agreement from a group 
of operatives with expertise in human error investigations to serve as part of the review 
panel for the study data.  I assumed that the personnel selected to assess the interrater 
reliability of the HFACS would have the necessary expertise and would be able to 
participate in an HFACS training workshop provided to assess the investigations. 
Scope and Delimitations 
I delimited this study to biopharmaceutical manufacturing organizations that 
handle drug substance products or active pharmaceutical ingredients, and I delimited the 
data collected to incident investigations in which human error was the central cause for 
deviation.  In addition, I delimited the information to incident investigations within 
functional departments related to the manufacturing of biopharmaceutical products.  The 
investigations evaluated covered a period of 2 years from 2013 to 2014.  Because this 
was a reliability study, the objective was to determine the interrater reliability of the 
HFACS taxonomy by assessing the level of consensus among users.  The study did not 
involve an attempt to determine the main causal factors of human error, but rather 
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revealed the utility of the HFACS taxonomy to these types of investigations in the 
biopharmaceutical industry. 
I delimited the determination of whether the HFACS is comprehensive enough to 
cover error incidents in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing environment by users in 
that industry.  I delimited the data to cover 161 incident reports from a biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing organization.  The data encompassed a 2-year period and included all 
investigations attributed to human error.  I also delimited the study to particular processes 
involving the bulk or active pharmaceutical ingredient manufacturing processes.  I 
selected the active pharmaceutical ingredients manufacturing processes for the 
biopharmaceutical industry because they represent one of the most complex and labor-
critical operations (Kayser & Warzecha, 2012).  Therefore, the study included only the 
manufacturing and support operations commonly used in those types of business (i.e., 
upstream and downstream processing, quality, and logistical task functions). 
Limitations 
There are limitations associated with reliability studies of incident coding using 
taxonomies.  The main limitations cited in studies are ability to generalize, availability of 
information, experience of participants with the taxonomies, and training (Olsen, 2011, 
2013).  Similar limitations affected this study.   
The limitation of the availability of the data was due to using the retrospective 
technique.  In the retrospective technique, the participants analyzed incident 
investigations in which the root cause of the event was human error.  Therefore, the 
information collected from the incident was the information documented in the 
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investigations record.  However, because the design of the study was to determine the 
level of consensus or agreement among coders, the information available for the 
determinations was similar and therefore allowed reliability.  The participants had access 
to typical incident reports that contained the facts drawn from the investigations, along 
with the circumstances of the occurrence of the events, which could mitigate the 
limitation. 
The other limitation of the study was that the participants did not have a high 
level of experience with the HFACS taxonomy.  Although the participants selected had 
experience in conducting incident investigations as well as the general conditions of the 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes, they did not normally use HFACS to 
conduct investigations.  This process aligned with other reliability studies in the literature 
(Olsen, 2013).  Therefore, a subject matter expert in the taxonomy provided the 
participants with detailed training on the HFACS.  The training allowed the experts in 
investigations to use the expanded elements in the HFACS for their analysis to create a 
more robust system for the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry. 
Significance of the Study 
Biopharmaceutical manufacturers could use the findings of this study to decrease 
human errors and improve the safety and reliability of their processes.  A review of the 
literature showed that researchers have undertaken human error studies in the aviation 
and nuclear power industries due to catastrophic accidents (Shappell et al., 2007).  The 
prevalence of accidents related to human error demonstrates a need to develop theoretical 
frameworks for understanding what factors influenced their occurrence.  In the Swiss 
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cheese theory, Reason (1990) identified an etiology of errors that divides the causes of 
human error into latent and active failures.  The HFACS represents an expansion of this 
framework because the elements used to define latent and active failures are more 
specific (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  As a result, the HFACS has gained preeminence 
for the analysis of accidents related to human errors. 
Apart from the multiple studies involving the HFACS, researchers in various 
industries have also started to consider human error as causing not only accidents but also 
production losses.  Researchers have used the HFACS in the maritime, mining, 
transportation, and health care industries to investigate accidents and improve the safety 
of operations (Berry et al., 2010).  However, as noted by Berry et al. (2010), the 
application of the HFACS beyond the aviation industry remains limited.  Even the use of 
the HFACS taxonomy in the maritime, mining, transportation, and health care industries 
is in its early stages, and a gap in the literature exists in other industries. 
Research into human error phenomena in pharmaceutical manufacturing 
organizations also remains limited.  One of the main reasons for the absence of 
significant research in this area is a lack of openness by pharmaceutical companies in 
terms of sharing sensitive production information (Rodchua, 2009).  In addition, there are 
no specific regulatory requirements for using human factors in the investigations (FDA, 
2011).  The complexity of many manufacturing processes, particularly biopharmaceutical 
processes, and the variability of data make it difficult to assess human error information 
during manufacturing investigations.  Further, leaders in the pharmaceutical industry 
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have not faced regulatory guidance that requires them to improve upon their current 
understanding of human error from the perspective of human factors.   
Biopharmaceutical manufacturing organizations have human operators for their 
critical processes; therefore, these processes are susceptible to human error.  
Biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes are complex and difficult, requiring multiple 
interactions among sophisticated equipment and human interventions (Rodriguez-Perez, 
2011).  This study is a first step in reducing not only the rate of human error in 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing operations but also the effect of the associated adverse 
consequences.  The findings of this study may play a crucial role in the professional 
setting of biopharmaceutical manufacturing for regulatory agencies such as the FDA, as 
the findings include information that policy makers can use to develop further regulations 
for reducing the incidence of human error. 
Industrial organizations have a direct impact on society because they are the 
primary sources of goods and services, employment opportunities, and economic 
supplies.  Human errors in manufacturing organizations represent a problem, not only 
because of their financial costs but also because of their adverse effects on the reliability 
and safety of industrial products (Glavin, 2010).  The health care industry creates 
superbly engineered products and services that are capable of providing safe, high-quality 
results for patients.  Further, improving patient safety by reducing human error should be 
the responsibility of health care organizations (ElBardissi et al., 2007; Glavin, 2010).  
Health care errors have serious consequences in terms of human suffering and monetary 
burdens.  Through this study, I present concrete results to aid in filling these gaps. 
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The findings of this study may help leaders of biotechnology manufacturing 
companies who participate in the health care system to reduce human error and improve 
the reliability of their processes.  The outcome may include better working conditions for 
employees and safer products at lower costs.  The reduction of errors could also help 
temper the negative social perception of drugs that could heighten general public safety 
(Glavin, 2010).  Better management of the costs associated with drug manufacturing 
activities can enable the continued development of safe and accessible drugs to address 
society’s unfulfilled needs. 
Summary 
Investigators have considered human errors the primary cause of many 
catastrophic events befalling industries.  Human errors have been persistent factors in 
investigations into these events and have led organizational leaders to study the 
phenomena to make their operations safer (Shappell et al., 2007).  The focus of studies of 
human factors has been on aviation and nuclear power organizations to help their leaders 
reduce the rates of accidents; as a result, research in other organizations has remained 
limited (Berry et al., 2010).  Therefore, a gap exists in the current research in terms of the 
other areas in which the effect of human error can be detrimental to the public and 
society.  The resulting lack of understanding of the essential factors or precursors of such 
errors precludes organizational leaders from preventing them. 
This chapter contained information regarding the need to study human error 
phenomena in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry.  I also developed research 
questions to increase the understanding of the utility of the current taxonomies for human 
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error investigations into biopharmaceutical processes.  I created two research questions to 
examine the validity of the HFACS using a reliability analysis to measure the relevance 
of the model for the industry.  This study was significant because it represented 
advancement in the topic of human error prevention.  Likewise, the study includes 
additional tools for professionals in biopharmaceutical manufacturing and the means to 
foster better health care by making medications affordable, accessible, and innovative. 
The results of an extensive literature review that includes an expansion of the 
human error theoretical frameworks and models, in addition to a review of the current 
research on the topic and emphasizing other industries, appear in Chapter 2.  A discussion 
of the methodology and statistical procedure used to conduct the analysis is in Chapter 3.  
The study results are in Chapter 4, and a discussion on the implications of the findings, 
the recommendations for future study, the limitations of the study, and a discussion on 




Chapter 2: Literature Review  
The objective of this literature review was to examine and synthesize relevant 
research as it related to this study.  To frame the existing gap in the literature, this study 
involved assessing how to use the HFACS, particularly as it relates to the human error 
investigation of causal factors, in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry.  The 
findings from the study may provide leaders of the biopharmaceutical industry with a tool 
that can lead to better human error investigations and a deeper understanding of the 
systemic factors that promote the occurrence of failures.  A better understanding of the 
error causal factors may lead to the implementation of preventative measures in the area, 
although such preventative measures are beyond the scope of the study.  The following 
paragraphs include an overview of the literature review. 
I developed this literature review following a funnel approach, starting with a link 
to the problem statement and the theoretical models of human errors such as the schema 
theory, generic error model, and Swiss cheese model.  I continued by analyzing the 
applications of the Swiss cheese model in the nuclear power operations and further 
expansion into the aviation industry with the introduction of the HFACS taxonomy.  I 
then analyzed the HFACS, particularly regarding the results of its application in multiple 
domains.  A synthesis and analysis present how the elements for human causal factors 
and accident prevention from the applications of HFACS allow for opportunities for error 
prevention. 
I also explored how HFACS relates to the health care industry, starting with 
medical providers and pharmaceutical manufacturing.  Finally, I compared the 
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biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes and the HFACS studies, including how to 
apply the variables of human factors and their effect on society.  This chapter ends with a 
summary and conclusion of the literature review, as well as a transition to Chapter 3. 
Literature Review Strategy 
This literature review includes articles from peer-reviewed scholarly journals 
obtained from various online research databases, including Google Scholar, 
ScienceDirect, ProQuest, and EBSCO libraries.  Additionally, the review includes 
relevant books from the Library of Congress and Walden University, the University of 
Pittsburgh, and the University of Wisconsin at Madison libraries.  Finally, the review 
includes articles and regulations from government regulatory bodies obtained from their 
official websites.  It also includes an examination of articles related to the theories and 
models of human error.  In addition, the studies involved the application and variables of 
the HFACS in various domains. 
I used a Boolean search strategy in the aforementioned databases to identify 
theoretical models of human error related to the study.  The search identified articles with 
key words and terms such as human error theories, human factor theories, and human 
error models.  An additional Boolean search strategy served to identify references related 
to error taxonomies using key words and terms such as Swiss cheese model, human error 
taxonomies, accident investigations, HFACS, high-reliability operations (HROs) and 
human factor investigations, accident investigations, and accident causal factors.  To 
locate articles related to regulations regarding human error investigations in health care 
and pharmaceutical manufacturing companies, the key words and terms used included 
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human error regulations, human factors regulations, pharmaceutical manufacturing 
investigations, human factors investigations, and biologics manufacturing.  The executed 
search strategy produced suitable peer-reviewed references, regulations, and other 
relevant scholarly works to develop the literature review.  The primary objective of this 
literature review was to locate current research on human error investigations with the 
use of human factors analysis and HFACS in multiple domains, particularly in the health 
care industry.  Furthermore, the primary focus of this review was biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing errors.  
Link to the Problem Statement 
Scholars have identified human errors as key contributing factors of major 
disasters in history.  Accident investigators have associated human elements with 
catastrophic events such as Three Mile Island, the Space Shuttle Challenger, the Exxon 
Valdez, and Chernobyl (Griffith & Mahadevan, 2011).  Using formal human error 
classification methods is common to investigate catastrophic events in complex safety-
critical systems (Altabbakh, Murray, Grantham, & Damle, 2013).  Furthermore, such 
classification systems have proven suitable for human error investigations, and 
investigators can use them either to examine events retrospectively or as a preventive tool 
to anticipate future errors.  Investigators achieve the retrospective or prospective analysis 
of human error through using formal human error taxonomy tools such as the HFACS 
based on modes to identify errors that could potentially occur during task performance.  
The HFACS has become a popular error analysis tool for the aviation industry as well as 
for other domains (Salmon et al., 2011; Salmon, Cornelissen, & Trotter, 2012).  Although 
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there is limited literature in domains outside the aviation industry, researchers have 
recently examined the HFACS and its application in other fields. 
Similarly, the incidence of human error has adversely affected the health care 
domain, including the manufacturing of drug products, and researchers have used 
HFACS to examine these errors in various studies (ElBardissi et al., 2007; Hughes, 
Sonesh, Zajac, & Salas, 2013).  Human error represents a problem in the manufacturing 
activities of pharmaceutical companies that jeopardizes the quality and reliability of their 
products (Collazo, 2008).  This study involved examining the issue of human error in the 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry, with a particular focus on how to use the 
theories and frameworks to understand the underlying factors that promote errors in that 
domain.  In this literature review, I examined recent research in the area of human error 
investigations, as well as theoretical frameworks and models, to study the incidents. 
Human Error Theoretical Frameworks 
Scholars have proposed various theories of human error within the existing 
literature to describe the drivers of accidents.  The focus of early psychological inquiries 
of human error was on the mental and behavioral aspects of the phenomenon, particularly 
in the cognitive domain (Reason, 1990).  Accordingly, from a behavioral perspective, 
scholars considered human error to be actions prompted by a response.  Individual 
performance may be the cause of actions that promote errors.  The major theories of 
human error allow for an understanding of how failures occur, which serves as a building 




Many researchers have conducted studies on the causes of errors based on 
performance behavior in which previous mental knowledge or conceptions trigger action 
sequences.  For instance, researchers have explained erratic human actions using the 
schema theory to elucidate an individual’s acts (Plant & Stanton, 2013; Reason, 1990; 
Stanton, Salmon, Walker, & Jenkins, 2009).  According to the schema theory, generic 
knowledge founded on past reactions or experiences organized around their perceptual 
organization or schemata forms the basis of the way an individual acts (Plant & Stanton, 
2013; Reason, 1990; Stanton et al., 2009, 2013).  Therefore, inappropriate activation of a 
schema or the lack of a known mode will produce a faulty action directed by the 
individual, thus resulting in a failure.  To this end, the individual’s mind and experiences 
are significant dynamics in the decisions that will prompt erratic actions. 
In such cases, proficiency, practice, and expertise with the individual role can 
influence errors.  Cognitive control is a function of the experience of the individual 
represented as a skill, rule, or knowledge-based behavior (Rasmussen, as cited in Reason, 
2008; Stanton & Salmon, 2009).  Therefore, human error events are the result of 
responses from perceived data that can be highly automatic and grounded in an 
individual’s skills, associations, or rules.  However, the sequence of errors can involve 
more than one person, particularly in an organizational setting. 
Generic Error Model (Organizational Perspective) 
The basis of the generic error modeling system is the theories of behavior 
responses centered on skills, rules, and knowledge.  Using the generic error modeling 
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system, Reason (1990, 2008) classified three broad groups of errors: the skill-based errors 
as slips and lapses grounded in automatic actions or execution, rules-based mistakes 
involving procedural steps, and knowledge-based errors arising from interpretation and 
evaluation.  The generic error modeling system shows that individuals’ preconditions and 
experiences with the schemes influence the information among the individuals involved 
in the failures.  This understanding differs from previous models that considered the 
individual to be only a single dimension of the error source. 
Theoretical models of human error that have a single dimension as their focus 
primarily center on either the individual operator or the system failures.  As noted by 
Salmon, Lenné, Stanton, Jenkins, and Walker (2010), human error models are either 
person or system approaches depending on the interactions examined.  However, the 
preferred model for error investigation must include factors beyond cognition or memory 
slips and lapses and focus on a combination of system-wide conditions for error 
examination.  Examining the gap in the literature revealed that an effective model for 
examining human error should consider failures at various levels within the organization 
or the interactions of various individuals in a sequence of activities. 
The result is a shift away from researching error from the individual’s perspective 
to examining operations in the broader organizational context.  For instance, a productive 
system results when uneventful and capable operations occur as individuals work 
harmoniously in a systematized arrangement (Reason, 1990, 2008; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003).  The elements of a productive system are in Figure 2.  The constituents 
of the productive system, including the decision makers; managers; preconditions such as 
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facilities, equipment, and environment; and personnel work together around a system of 
defenses to maintain flawless execution.  The logistics of an organization protect the 
integrity of operations under the structural controls. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Productive system diagram.  From Human Error (p. 200), by J. Reason, 1990, 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  Copyright 1990 by Cambridge University 
Press.  Adapted with permission. 
 
Leaders must take the organizational parts necessary to maintain a productive 
system into consideration when designing the functions of the operations with an 
emphasis on communication.  Efficient design systems should consider all the factors of 
the operations, including mitigating actions for unforeseeable events (Raheja & Gullo, 
2012; Reason, 1990, 2008; Salvendy, 2012; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  The 
productivity of the company and elimination of errors depends on how well all the 
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defenses and feedback loops operate according to expectations.  However, a perfect and 
flawless production system is not the norm, and problems sometimes arise.  The 
organizational perspective provides the explanations for a perfect system, but any system 
has gaps that cause errors. 
Swiss Cheese Causal Factors Model 
The Swiss cheese model is a representation of the problems caused by the gaps in 
a productive system.  The Reason (1990) Swiss cheese model of accident causation (see 
Figure 3) presents the effect of causal failures in productive systems.  In the model, the 
failures of the different parts of the production systems are the holes in the cheese 
(Reason, 1990, 2008; Shappell et al., 2007; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  The model 
shows that defenses can lose effectiveness in sustaining a consistent and productive 
process; therefore, the holes represent the vulnerabilities of the organization.  The model 
also provides an explanation of the interactions of the vulnerabilities among the system 
components that lead to failures in latent and active levels that can align to produce a 





Figure 3.  The Swiss cheese model.  From A Human Error Approach to Aviation 
Accident Analysis (p. 47), by D. A. Wiegmann & S. A. Shappell, 2003, Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate.  Copyright 2003 by Douglas A. Wiegmann and Scott A. Shappell.  Adapted 
with permission. 
 
The Swiss cheese model is one of the most relevant investigative methods used 
for accident investigations in various industries.  The model has widespread applications 
so practitioners can expand investigations beyond individual or active failures to 
applicability in complex systems and their interactions (Altabbakh et al., 2013; D. S. Kim 
& Yoon, 2013; Peck, 2013).  The model demonstrates that accidents are the outcomes of 
various causal factors subdivided into latent and active conditions.  Accordingly, scholars 
have used the model to determine accident causations based on the contributing factors at 
all organizational levels.  This holistic view is possible because the layers include the 
individual in the active failures and unsafe acts, as well as the organizational elements 
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such as supervision and organizational influences (Altabbakh et al., 2013).  Because the 
model tracks the causes of actions at various levels of the organization, it also challenges 
the reliability of the organization rather than blaming the individuals involved in the 
errors. 
For instance, the investigation of the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion in 1986 
showed that the pilots or crewmembers were not responsible for the error that caused the 
catastrophic outcome.  Using the Swiss cheese model to analyze the disaster, 
investigators determined that the main cause was poor decision making at the upper 
management level (Altabbakh et al., 2013).  Furthermore, a sequence of causal factors 
occurred in the events that caused the explosion, including problems with the safety 
programs, budgetary constraints, and pressures to launch (Altabbakh et al., 2013).  The 
investigators did not examine the latent conditions in the process to identify the 
associated risks and preventative actions needed.  Furthermore, the investigators did not 
consider the defenses to prevent accidents during the launch process, including the 
reliability of the organization and leadership. 
The reliability of an organization is dependent upon the strength of the defenses 
and systems to identify and prevent the effect of latent conditions.  As noted by 
Altabbakh et al. (2013), latent conditions can be present at all levels of the organization 
and may be difficult to identify because they may emerge as lack of training, poor design, 
inadequate supervision, and unnoticed defects in manufacturing.  Many organizational 
leaders then seek to improve organizational performance by increasing the level of 
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reliability; in terms of the Swiss cheese model, the organizational leaders attempt to 
identify the holes in the systems and present the alignment. 
High-Reliability Operations (HRO)  
As part of their accident investigation and reduction program, leaders of nuclear 
power organizations developed the latest version of the Swiss cheese model for accident 
causation driven by public concern over nuclear accidents caused by operators in the 
United States.  The nuclear power operations applied the elements of the Swiss cheese 
model to form the HROs with the objective of conducting high-quality procedures for 
longer periods without the presence of errors (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008a, 2008b; 
Wu et al., 2009).  With a more robust and efficient system, leaders of nuclear power 
organizations provide the expected services while protecting stakeholders from hazards. 
Stakeholders, including customers, employees, and management, are an integral 
part of organizations.  They play important roles in achieving the levels of reliability 
required to maintain the safety of nuclear operations.  For instance, people are fallible, 
and even top employees make mistakes; however, organizational actions and processes 
influence individual performance (Peck, 2013).  Accordingly, leaders can encourage 
operators to achieve higher performance by providing them with organizational processes 
that increase their understanding of the situations that generate errors to help them learn 
from past events. 
The organizational perspective includes programs that incorporate the standpoint 
and support of all groups working together collaboratively.  The organizational process 
identified by the nuclear power operations incorporates human performance factors from 
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all stakeholders, but management provides the primary support; in particular, these 
factors include training, a model for investigations, and an environment that allows for 
open communication (Eubanks & Mumford, 2010; Peck, 2013; U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2008b).  Organizational influence through management support and participation 
strengthens the information sharing nurtured by individuals who trust leadership.  The 
resulting environment prevents incidents of blaming operators while considering more 
systemic issues, including near misses during error investigations. 
Investigations in highly reliable operations evaluate all causal factors in all 
organizational parts, rather than the specific elements of the event.  Researchers of 
nuclear power operations have indicated that increasing the understanding of human error 
precursors at all layers of the operations and focusing the defense barriers on near-miss 
evaluations help to direct the investigation process toward accident avoidance (Salmon et 
al., 2010; U.S. Department of Energy, 2008a).  A proper analysis of near misses from a 
systemic causal point of view makes the defenses against future accidents stronger by 
providing a higher level of awareness of the hazards present.  Reducing the number of 
near misses may lead to a decrease in the number of failures resulting from accidents. 
Despite the effectiveness of the Swiss cheese causal factors model in the nuclear 
power industry in increasing reliability while reducing accidents, the model lacks 
specificity to allow applicability that is more flexible in other domains.  The model lacks 
an ability to identify failures in barriers or absent defenses, thereby limiting the 
transferability to multiple domains (Kotogiannis & Malakis, 2009; Salmon et al., 2010; 
Shappell & Wiegmann, 2009; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  Thus, the model does not 
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specify the holes, their size, their extent, or the relations among the causal factors of 
accidents.  As a result, researchers have developed models to analyze the gaps in the 
defenses to develop a better understanding of the causal factors of many accidents. 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
The Swiss cheese model lacks information on the factors that cause the failures in 
the systems.  To expand the knowledge of the causal factors or the holes of the Swiss 
cheese model, Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) examined aviation accidents to understand 
the causal factors for aviation systems.  The researchers studied each defensive layer and 
classified the unsafe acts and latent conditions in a taxonomy with four main tier 
categories, as presented in Figure 4.  The categories align with the Swiss cheese model in 
which causal influence follows in succession and includes specific factors for each 





Figure 4.  The HFACS taxonomy.  From A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident 
Analysis (p. 71), by D. A. Wiegmann & S. A. Shappell, 2003, Burlington, VT: Ashgate.  
Copyright 2003 by Douglas A. Wiegmann and Scott A. Shappell.  Adapted with 
permission. 
 
The HFACS taxonomy provides tools that allow aviation accident investigators to 
identify the active failures more systemically, including the interactions between the 
various levels of the organization.  Researchers have demonstrated that the HFACS 
allows examinations of the failures causing the accidents, as well as interactions among 
causal factors (Belland, Olsen, & Russell, 2010; Berry, 2010; Berry et al., 2010; Paletz, 
Bearman, Orasanu, & Holbrook, 2009; Patterson & Shappell, 2010; Walker et al., 2011;).  
Therefore, the HFACS is suitable as a predictive tool for human error accidents because 
it can identify the linking factors between latent and active conditions.  The association of 
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factors allows the HFACS to become a preventive tool for increasing the safety of 
operations. 
HFACS Applications 
Accident investigators have used the HFACS as a preferred investigative tool for 
examining the human contributions and causal factors of accidents caused by human 
errors in many domains.  Researchers have applied the HFACS taxonomy for the 
classification of errors in accidents in several fields, including the military (Walker et al., 
2011), air traffic control (Moon, Yoo, & Choi, 2011), maritime (Celik & Cebi, 2009; 
Chauvin et al., 2013; Schröder-Hinrichs, Baldauf, & Ghirx, 2011), mining (Lenné, 
Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 2012; Patterson & Shappell, 2010), and railroad industries 
(Baysari, Caponecchia, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2009; D. S. Kim & Yoon, 2013).  The 
results from these studies provided strong support for the function of taxonomy to 
improve the human error investigations of other domains. 
The use of the HFACS in other domains has also generated variations based on 
the needs of the particular organizations.  Because the HFACS is general and nonspecific, 
investigators can tailor it to other domains (D. S. Kim & Yoon, 2013; Walker et al., 
2011).  An example of diverse derivatives of the HFACS is in Table 1.  The researchers 
adapted the particular requirements for the needs and regulations of the domains.  For 
instance, one of the most common adaptations of the maritime shipping industry includes 
adding a fifth category to evaluate the effects of external factors that can include 
regulatory or government influences (Chen & Chou, 2012; Chen et al., 2013).  Chen et al. 
(2013) studied the need for additional categories involving external intrusions in open 
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systems such as the railroad and aircraft industries rather than closed systems such as 
nuclear power plants or hospitals.  Furthermore, the abundance of adaptability has 
allowed researchers to conduct critical analyses of the modes of applications to other 





Derivative Field of Study Reference 
DoD-HFACS Military Walker et al., 2011 
HFACS-ADF Aviation: Australian  Olsen & Shorrock, 2010 
HFACS-STAMP Aviation  Harris & Li, 2011 
HFACS-MA Maritime Chen et al., 2013 
HFACS-RR Railroad Baysari et al., 2009; D. S. Kim & 
Yoon, 2013 
HFACS-ME Maintenance Rashid, Place & Braithwaite, 2010 
HFACS-ATF Air traffic control Moon, Yoo, & Choi, 2011 
HFACS-MI Mining Patterson & Shappell, 2010 
HFACS-MSS Machinery spaces on ships  Schroder-Hinrichs et al., 2011 
Note. DoD = U.S. Department of Defense. HFACS = human factors analysis and 
classification system. 
 
Despite the limitations in current research with the use of the HFACS taxonomy 
and its derivatives in various domains, researchers have pointed to some advantages of 
the uses.  For instance, the HFACS taxonomy is easy to use, provides a consistent 
structure for analysis, and is comprehensive as it encompasses multiple levels of the 
system (Stanton et al., 2013).  The general components of the HFACS taxonomy as well 
as the ease of adaptability to other domains allow for a uniform and well-defined analysis 
of errors.  Using the HFACS taxonomy, investigators can accomplish accident 
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investigations by compiling the causal factors observed or the error contributing factors 
in an organized manner. 
Error Contributing Factors 
One of the main advantages of the HFACS is that investigators can compile the 
results in the core error categories of the taxonomy, allowing for a deeper examination of 
the causal factors.  The HFACS includes all the theoretical knowledge of human factors, 
from the lower level individual errors to the higher level supervision and organizational 
errors (Stanton et al., 2013).  The HFACS allows practitioners to investigate the specific 
categories that are likely to cause issues and errors.  In addition, practitioners can focus 
on determining the factors most predominant in the investigations and on whether any 
correlations exist among them. 
In the research conducted using the HFACS in aviation, the causal factors 
associated with skill-based errors and violations were the most prominent cause of 
accidents.  The studies of aviation conducted in the United States (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2009), as well as outside the United States (Lenné, Ashby, & Fitzharris, 
2008), have shown that skill-based errors caused the majority of accidents.  Furthermore, 
when analyzing the accidents in terms of fatality, data showed that violations were 
responsible for the majority of the lethal accidents (Shappell et al., 2007).  Researchers 
have since compared these results from the aviation industry to other domains to identify 
the causal factors of accidents. 
The results across other domains aligned with those of the aviation industry for 
accident causations.  For instance, studies in the maritime, railroad, and mining industries 
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revealed that skill-based errors were among the main causes of accidents (Baysari et al., 
2009; Celik & Cebi, 2009; Patterson & Shappell, 2010; Read, Lenné, & Moss, 2012).  
Even though each industry is different in its operations, the human element is 
considerable in the causal factors among them; however, investigators also observed 
additional factors when using the HFACS in other domains. 
For example, when evaluating accidents in other fields using the HFACS, 
contributing factors from the organizational and supervisor categories emerged.  In a 
study of mining accidents, Patterson and Shappell (2010) observed that inadequate 
leadership was a main causal factor for accidents.  In addition, studies conducted in the 
railroad industry created an additional category of outside factors including regulatory 
elements and how leaders in the industry operate in their decisions, as well as 
incorporating resource management and adverse mental stage types to the preconditions 
tier; however, human failure of the operator occurred in the highest percentage of 
accidents (Baysari et al., 2009; D. S. Kim & Yoon, 2013).  In other domains such as air 
traffic control (Kotogiannis & Malakis, 2009) and computer data entry (Barchard & Pace, 
2011; Bergeon & Hensley, 2009), the predominant categories from both domains 
observed were skill and decision errors.  However, human errors are not random events, 
and investigators can attribute them to a combination of causes or contributing factors. 
As a result, when evaluating accidents using causal factor taxonomies, researchers 
demonstrated the presence of relationships among the causes.  For instance, in a study of 
aviation accidents, researchers identified a relationship between the two causal category 
layers, decision errors and skill-based errors, with organizational, administrative, and 
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human crew violations (Shappell et al., 2007; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2009).  In addition, 
researchers have evaluated the associations among error causal factors in the various 
category levels of other domains. 
In mining industry studies, results have indicated the presence of a combination of 
factors.  Patterson and Shappell (2010) identified skill-based errors and decision errors as 
the most prevalent, with associated preconditions of communication and the physical 
environment as well as unsafe leadership; all these conditions contributed to 62% of the 
errors.  Furthermore, Patterson and Shappell found relationships among knowledge-based 
errors with training and qualifications as well as rules-based errors.  Studies in other 
domains indicated relationships exist among factors in health care operations; for 
instance, physical and mental limitation may be a precursor for a skill-based error, a 
decision error, a routine violation, or exceptional violations (ElBardissi et al., 2007).  
Also, a multi-industry analysis of causal factors evaluating cases of food industry, 
maintenance, mining, and show entertainment accidents revealed relationships among the 
latent conditions and active failures.  In particular, an association existed between 
decision errors and crew resource management (CRM; Berry et al., 2010).  The 
importance of relationships to error analysis is a significant component of HFACS error 
examinations. 
Even though researchers have used the HFACS in studies in industrial and 
operational domains, the existing research remains limited.  Researchers have applied the 
HFACS in examinations of accidents in areas such as construction (Garrett & Teizer, 
2009; Hale, Walker, Walters, & Bolt, 2012), mining (Patterson & Shappell, 2010; Shi, 
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Jiang, Zheng, & Cui, 2011), automotive manufacturing (Reyes-Martínez, Maldonado-
Macías, & Prado-León, 2012), water production (Wu et al., 2009), oil refining (Gholi-
Nejad et al., 2012), and industrial maintenance (Aju-kumar & Gandhi, 2011; Noroozi, 
Khakzad, Khan, MacKinnon, & Abbassi, 2013).  A limitation of all the studies was the 
examination of a small number of accidents using the HFACS taxonomy to identify their 
underlying causes.  The results from the industrial studies showed that the HFACS 
taxonomy is a viable methodology for accident investigation but failed to show rigor, 
which raised validity concerns. 
HFACS Limitations 
Some researchers have questioned the reliability and validity of the HFACS 
taxonomy in identifying the causal factors of errors.  Olsen and Shorrock (2010) 
challenged the level of agreement among several error investigators when using a 
modified model of the HFACS but were not able to prove or disprove the reliability of 
the instrument of the HFACS taxonomy.  Olsen and Shorrock were not able to confirm or 
contradict the reliability of the adapted taxonomy when applied to investigations on air 
traffic controllers’ errors.  Although there is substantial reliability for using the HFACS 
tool in aviation, the information in other domains is limited. 
One of the main issues identified in the literature was the lack of solid studies on 
the HFACS and its derivative forms.  According to Olsen (2011), multiple researchers 
have used unacceptable or questionable methodologies for reliability; these studies often 
lack statistical significance and independent reviews, as they are primarily components of 
graduate studies (Olsen, 2011, 2013; Olsen & Shorrock, 2010).  Furthermore, multiple 
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HFACS studies have included the contributions of the taxonomy, which may denote a 
lack of independence (Olsen, 2011).  The reliability of the HFACS studies relates to the 
ability of the coders to validate whether they can have reproducibility among individual 
coders and the lack of statistical significance.  Conversely, the proliferation of the 
HFACS taxonomy and its derivatives is continually expanding the availability of data 
regarding the reliability of the taxonomies. 
Despite questions regarding the reliability of the HFACS in the literature, 
researchers and practitioners continue to use the HFACS.  For instance, U.S. Department 
of Defense researchers identified the HFACS taxonomy as useful in determining the 
associations of causal factors by providing for usability as well as potential for 
investigations that can predict errors (O’Connor, Cowan, & Jeffrey, 2010; O’Connor & 
Walker, 2011; O’Connor, Walliser, & Philips, 2010; Walker et al., 2011).  Furthermore, 
researchers have evaluated the reliability of the HFACS in various studies by identifying 
a proper agreement among raters based on Cohen kappa values of .60 to .74 (Ergai, 2013; 
Harris & Li, 2011; Li & Harris, 2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  In addition, various 
researchers have identified a variety of significant causal factor pairs and reported a 
significant chi square value (p ≤ .001) and a significant odds ratio (p ≤ .01), thus 
indicating the validity of the taxonomy (Berry et al., 2010; Stanton et al., 2013).  
Nevertheless, researchers of studies on the use of the HFACS have provided significant 




As previously discussed, the main causal factors in the active failures tiers relate 
to the latent conditions of the organization and supervision.  Similarly, studies have 
shown that CRM training, knowledge, and experience had the greatest influence on error 
and operations (Arthur et al., 2011; Kotogiannis & Malakis, 2009).  Training and CRM 
provide an understanding of how organizational management and employees have a 
direct effect on the causal factors of errors and, more important, how human attitudes can 
play a key role in error detection. 
Developers of the most successful organizational programs such as HRO and 
CRM have established that to identify errors and precursors, the workers and 
management need to cooperate to achieve a culture of collaboration and openness.  Error 
management and CRM training address the mindset factors that may affect error 
detection, such as behaviors that promote errors (Arthur et al., 2011).  Furthermore, the 
focus of CRM is to eliminate errors by emphasizing the performance of the team rather 
than of the individual (Kanki, Helmreich, & Anca, 2010).  As a result, investigators 
evaluate the errors not from an individual perspective but from a system point of view.  
The result is a culture in which assigning blame is not the main objective of the error 
investigations. 
The focus of the team members in CRM is to be vigilant and aware that errors can 
occur; as a result, team members seek signs of fatigue, abnormal behaviors, or stress that 
can promote accidents.  In the aviation domain, organizational leaders seek to instill 
alertness to prevent errors by developing appropriate attitudes and encouraging the 
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courageous behavior of speaking up by critiquing oneself, cross checking team members, 
verbalizing routine actions under a high workload, and consciously repeating back 
instructions (Kanki et al., 2010).  Team members become familiar with their colleagues’ 
challenges and scrutinize their actions to detect potential mistake conditions.  These 
practices result in a culture of open communication and can lead to fewer errors or errors 
detected in a timely fashion. 
The basis of the organizational practices of the CRM and HRO organizations is 
the open and blame-free culture founded on rigorous standard procedures.  The standard 
operating procedure defines the working activities of the team, including communication 
and decision making (Kanki et al., 2010).  By following the standard procedure, the 
whole team knows the functions and actions each member must follow, which reduces 
the possibility of mistakes.  The primary responsibility of performance and adherence to 
the procedure belongs to the team leader or, in the case of the crew, the captain.  
Although each organization is unique, leaders shape the culture and define whether they 
promote high reliability and safety as their primary objectives. 
Human Errors in Health Care  
The issue of reliability and safety due to the occurrence of human errors in health 
care is significant and considered a major cause of deaths in hospitals.  More people die 
in hospitals due to medical errors every day than from HIV/AIDS and road traffic 
accidents (Runciman et al., 2007; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013).  
In recognition of this issue, health care authorities and practitioners have requested that 
health care institutions report human errors to authorities (London Medicines and 
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Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, 2012).  For this reason, practitioners in medical 
institutions seek human error reduction tools so they can mitigate the effect on patients. 
As a result, medical error investigators have used human error theories and 
taxonomies extensively in many areas of the health care field to examine the causal 
factors.  For instance, medical error investigators have used human error theories and the 
HFACS in the most critical areas of medical institutions, including intensive care units 
(Bion, Abrusci, & Hibbert, 2010; Elliott, Page, & Worrall-Carter, 2012), operating rooms 
(Bosma, Veen, & Roukema, 2011; Catchpole et al., 2007; Diller et al., 2014; ElBardissi 
et al., 2007; Wiegmann & Dunn, 2010), emergency rooms (Bleetman, Sanusi, Dale, & 
Brace, 2012; Itoh, Omata, & Andersen, 2009), medication (Hughes et al., 2013; Werner, 
Nelson, & Boehm-Davis, 2012), nursing (Armitage, 2009), and informatics (Cacciabue & 
Vella, 2010).  Results from the studies revealed that researchers have found causal factors 
similar to those observed in aviation and other domains in the majority of health care 
areas. 
In operating rooms and during cardiovascular surgeries, practitioners who study 
errors can use the HFACS to identify the latent and active conditions as well as the 
correlations of the causal factors of errors.  Skill-based failures were the most common 
type of unsafe act observed, along with supervisory and planning errors, especially in the 
form of too many tasks performed at the same time (ElBardissi et al., 2007).  ElBardissi 
et al. (2007) demonstrated that the HFACS is a tool that enhances medical error 
investigations, as it incorporates factors not commonly examined, including latent and 
active failures.  Studies of human factors in the area of health care have shown that the 
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interventions identified in other domains such as aviation and nuclear operations will not 
function alike in the health care field. 
In health care, errors do not affect the medical staff in the same manner as errors 
affect personnel involved in other domains such as nuclear power organizations or mass 
transportation.  For instance, in aviation, lives are in danger when errors occur, and the 
culture promotes open reporting with limited immunity, protection of the parties 
involved, and anonymity (Ricci, Panos, Lincoln, Salerno, & Warshauer, 2012).  In 
contrast, identifying errors or near misses in the health care field can have personal 
implications for the medical staff, as practitioners fear for their reputation, legal 
implications, and questions regarding their expertise (Dekker & Nice, 2013; Faltin, 
Kenett, & Ruggeri, 2012).  Furthermore, as noted by Dekker and Nice (2013), a just 
culture is not the same for all health professionals, as it represents a predicament with 
accountability for medical errors.  The resulting culture demonstrates no communication 
of errors or near misses because of fear due to negative or adverse implications.  For 
leaders of health care institutions, the main challenge is to implement a just culture that 
protects all stakeholders, including patients and medical staff. 
The organizational elements of CRM become more relevant in medical institution 
settings, as all stakeholders need to stimulate the culture under the direction of the 
organizational leadership.  As noted by Smith (2010), organizational leaders who 
promote a just culture by fostering the courageous behavior of employees speaking up 
require adequate training in all fundamentals, with patient safety as the principal goal.  
The CRM aspects applied in medical settings will support teamwork and eliminate the 
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fear of blame in reporting incidents and behaviors.  The existence of fear among 
management leads to a blame culture, which is the main requirement for identifying the 
latent causal factors or error precursors that challenge the applicability of the HFACS or 
the HRO system. 
Medical practitioners have not entirely accepted the direct relevance of the 
aviation human error investigational and prevention practices to the medical field.  
According to Ricci et al. (2012), although aviation tools expand the understanding and 
prevention of medical errors, there are many differences among the domains, such as 
regulations and operating settings.  Conversely, many commonalities exist between 
aviation and health care, particularly the rapidly changing situations that predispose 
individuals to errors, such as high turnover of patients, time constraints, diversity of 
clinical cases, shift work, and stress (Bleetman et al., 2012; Mansour, James & Edgley, 
2012).  Although the conditions of aviation and health care may not match precisely, 
applying the HFACS to recognize and prevent errors increases the opportunities of 
benefit to patients and medical staff. 
Regulatory bodies have recognized the importance of reporting human errors as 
well as near misses.  As an example, researchers at the London Medicines and Healthcare 
Products Regulatory Agency (2012) noted that in the area of blood transfusions, leaders 
in medical institutions reported anxiety and execution assumptions caused 50% of the 
3,000 errors, including 1,000 near misses.  Although the leaders of regulatory agencies 
are requesting error reporting from medical institutions, the error types requested only 
include categories such as incorrect process, incorrect procedure, procedural steps 
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omitted, lapsed or no training, inadequate training, ineffective training, rushing, 
concentration lapse, and communication (Langham, 2012).  The error categories 
requested are primarily in the active or individual area, which misses causal factors in 
latent conditions, as presented by the HFACS in Figure 3.  Although the leaders of 
regulatory agencies in the health care field are requesting error investigations and 
reporting, they are not using human factor analysis to determine the source. 
Human Errors in Pharmaceutical Manufacturing  
The pharmaceutical manufacturing industry is another complex, highly technical, 
and regulated component of the health care domain that is vulnerable to human errors and 
can benefit from the theoretical frameworks previously discussed.  Leaders of regulatory 
agencies require that leaders in pharmaceutical manufacturing companies identify errors 
and deviations by conducting investigations according to the regulatory agency 
requirements.  Specifically, as noted by Rodriguez-Perez (2011), FDA leaders require 
that the members of the quality control unit review records to confirm that errors did not 
occur during manufacturing or, in the case of errors, to investigate the cause of the 
occurrence.  Furthermore, one of the primary causes for regulatory observations during 
FDA inspections in pharmaceutical companies is the lack of adequate investigations for 
deviations during manufacturing operations (Rodriguez-Perez, 2011).  The companies are 
still not effectively meeting the requirements of the regulatory agencies by properly 
investigating the process deviations, as they are not determining the source of the errors. 
Investigations in the pharmaceutical industry are deficient and lack the ability to 
identify both the root cause and the necessary corrective actions.  A report from the FDA 
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on pharmaceutical manufacturing indicated that human factors were present as a cause 
for deviations or drift in manufacturing processes (Friedman, Smedley, Torbeck, & 
Santiago, 2011).  The pharmaceutical regulations require that organizational leaders 
reduce variability in their operations and procedures by implementing corrective and 
preventative actions based on the root cause of investigations.  However, many company 
leaders are still failing to identify the root cause before they implement corrective actions.  
For example, approximately 80% of the investigations in the pharmaceutical industry 
cited human error as the root cause and thus leaders implemented operator retraining as 
the corrective action (Collazo, 2011).  This finding demonstrated that investigations lack 
the theoretical fundamentals previously discussed, as human error should be an outcome 
rather than a cause.  The resulting corrective action of retraining is inadequate because it 
fails to address the root cause. 
Another problem with the current error investigation process in the 
pharmaceutical industry is an emphasis on process optimization.  The focus of typical 
investigation process in such organizations is process optimization tools and problem-
solving techniques designed for production industries rather than looking at causal factors 
(Korakianti & Rekkas, 2011; McCormick & Wylie-McVay, 2012; Myszewski, 2010, 
2012).  The focus of these investigations was on identifying the parts of the process that 
fail based on the assumption that correcting a part of the process will stop the error.  The 
result of such an investigation is an ineffective corrective action because, as in the case of 




To improve the investigations related to human error, leaders of pharmaceutical 
organizations are expanding root cause analysis in the active failure categories.  For 
instance, human error investigations have expanded to identify errors in the categories of 
active failures, including omission, slips, memory lapses, and mistakes (Wachter & 
Yorio, 2013).  The resulting investigations expand the examinations for errors as a cause 
of the active failure as well as to incorporate precursors of such errors.  However, the 
human investigations process is still lacking, as investigators do not consider latent 
failures to be error precursors. 
Although the literature of human error investigations in the pharmaceutical 
industry using causal factors is lacking, some researchers have used the concept of the 
Swiss cheese framework.  Researchers used error modeling and causal factors to 
investigate human error in analytical test results in quality assurance laboratories 
(Kuselman, Pennecchi, Fajgelj, & Karpov, 2013).  Kuselman et al. (2013) suggested the 
taxonomy of defensive layers, including latent and active conditions in the validations of 
the analytical method, the training of analysts, quality control, and supervision.  A 
limitation of the study was Kuselman et al.’s (2013) use of laboratory testing and their 
presentation of only a proposal of the model, which therefore lacked application to real 
cases.  In addition, the study had the same limitations previously identified for the Swiss 
cheese model, in which a taxonomy to classify the specific failure conditions was 
missing. 
Many researchers studied the use of aviation-derived taxonomies for applicability 
in pharmaceutical manufacturing settings.  For instance, Konstantinos et al. (2011) 
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studied how the existing industry regulatory requirements permit adapting the aircraft 
maintenance human factors taxonomy to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry.  
Konstantinos et al. found the current requirements of good manufacturing practices from 
pharmaceutical regulatory agencies in Europe and the United States support the 
implementation of human factors analysis systems.  In addition, more than half of the 
respondents of a survey indicated the main area with the potential to cause errors was the 
team and organizational factors (Konstantinos et al., 2011).  The study showed that the 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries would benefit from using a model for 
analyzing errors that includes human factors in latent and active layers.  However, a 
limitation of the study was that the researchers did not delineate a clear taxonomy and did 
not examine applicability into actual error investigations. 
Model for Biotechnology Manufacturing Investigations 
Although the research described above illustrated that human error is a significant 
problem, the literature review indicated that researchers have largely neglected the 
application of systems-based error methods for investigations within the biotechnology 
manufacturing field.  Most important, the review of literature revealed a gap in the use of 
human factors analysis for the investigation of human errors in health care and 
pharmaceutical processes (Rodriguez-Perez, 2011).  Only one study in this review 
included an evaluation of human factors analysis for human error in the 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry. 
Konstantinos et al. (2011) conducted a study using aviation taxonomy in Europe 
with human factors analysis in the biopharmaceutical industry and demonstrated limited 
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empirical results, as the data did not include real investigations and the focus was on the 
regulatory environment and some elements of applicability.  However, the literature 
identified in the field of human error indicated that investigations could benefit from a 
more comprehensive analysis.  The review also revealed that models such as the Swiss 
cheese framework and the HFACS have been effective in reducing accidents and errors 
in many domains. 
Human error investigation and corrective and preventive actions are the most 
commonly applied tools of error management within the pharmaceutical industry.  
Researchers have emphasized risk management, reliability, six sigma, or process failures 
rather than system conditions (Junker, 2008; Lewis, Hernandez, & Meadors, 2013; Lopez 
et al., 2010).  The result was a focus on process quality instead of error elimination based 
on the identification of different driver errors and error-causing conditions in the 
manufacturing operations.  An approach that permits practitioners to evaluate the causal 
factors in a systemic and proactive manner needs to drive the investigation processes. 
Despite the lack of information on the applicability of the HFACS to 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing, the system represents a more proactive error 
management approach for investigations.  According to the literature, researchers have 
not yet investigated the aviation taxonomy for human error investigations within the 
biopharmaceuticals manufacturing context, but the taxonomy represents an alternative 
that interests regulatory bodies (Konstantinos et al., 2011).  Pharmaceutical industry 
investigators can examine human error by applying factors related to the other 
dimensions of the latent conditions. 
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Studies in the literature indicated that error investigators can use causal factors in 
multiple domains, including the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry.  The factors 
used in the HFACS taxonomy are transferrable and easy to modify for application to 
multiple domains (Stanton et al., 2013).  In addition, the factors are general and permit 
modifications within four main categories: acts, preconditions, supervision, and 
organizational influences.  However, the taxonomy must align to match the needs of the 
domain, which in this case was the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry. 
The biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry is complex, and its processes are 
susceptible to deviations that result in significant losses.  Biopharmaceutical productions 
involve multiple and lengthy steps that run continuously and require advanced equipment 
for manufacturing as well as knowledgeable and skilled operators (Kayser & Warzecha, 
2012).  The high level of technology required from the operations and the workers 
necessitates an increased degree of accuracy and commitment.  The resulting conditions 
are highly stressing, as the operators must work during shifts under pressure. 
The intensity of the biopharmaceutical manufacturing operations promotes the 
occurrence of deviations primarily associated with human errors.  According to 
Konstantinos et al. (2011), human errors are the result of an organization’s issues and a 
lack of resources.  Although the literature revealed a need to classify the causes of human 
factors, the focus of the current taxonomies for investigation is on the operator level.  The 
focus of the causes of human errors is then a limited scope of factors. 
The main factors documented at the first tier of active failures in the 
biotechnology industry are similar to the health care and pharmaceutical industries.  The 
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FDA (2011) included slips, lapses, and mistakes in the causal categories of errors.  In 
addition, researchers commonly accept that when human error occurs, the second tier of 
the cause generally falls into the categories of application, decision, documentation, 
learning–training gap, memory gap, or omission (Collazo, 2008).  As demonstrated in the 
discussion of the medical establishment, investigations with this type of root cause 
include only active failures and miss the latent conditions. 
To conduct human error investigations that produce real root causes that allow for 
the identification of preconditions and latent conditions, researchers must use a 
taxonomy, such as the HFACS, which will permit them to view the whole spectrum.  As 
noted by Stanton et al. (2013), error investigators can apply the HFACS to any domain, 
thus allowing for a deeper analysis of the combinations of causal factors with the 
application of simple statistical techniques that allow for correlations among factor tiers.  
Investigators can therefore modify the HFACS with the current error categories used for 
investigation to have a more robust process.  The investigation process will then be 
proactive in preventing errors to ensure the production of safe and high-quality products. 
Having increasingly robust investigations increases the quality of the production 
processes while reducing losses and manufacturing costs.  According to Clarke (2009), 
the cost associated with human errors in drug manufacturing is $30.7 billion.  Also, due 
to the expensive and complicated nature of biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes, 
production losses lead to a significant financial impact that affects costs and delays in 
time to market (Subramaniam, 2012).  The reduction of error through accurate 
investigations has a direct impact on the cost of health care and the timely introduction of 
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products to the market.  Biopharmaceutical drugs play a significant role in health care 
and society in general. 
The biopharmaceutical industry is the most active sector in developing new 
therapies for treating medical needs.  For example, the industry has produced more than 
200 new therapies since 2002 for the treatment of significant diseases such as HIV, 
diabetes, and various forms of cancer (Kayser & Warzecha, 2012).  In addition, the drug 
regulatory authorities approve 10–15 new products, including new therapies, each year in 
the biopharmaceutical sector (Kayser & Warzecha, 2012).  The innovations of the 
biotechnology industry are substantial and are a vital source of therapy to improve patient 
health.  However, innovation and the availability of products are still problems. 
The introduction of new products has been decreasing because of cost constraints.  
According to recent studies, the volume of new products since 2002 has been declining 
(Cuttler & Sahni, 2013; Lanthier, Miller, Nardinelli, & Woodcock, 2013).  The 
expectation is that the high cost associated with losses due to errors will affect the funds 
available to companies for innovations and the introduction of new drugs.  It is 
imperative to maintain the output of cost-effective products and therapies through more 
efficient and reliable manufacturing processes. 
Conclusions and Transition 
The theories regarding human error include the individual actions from slips and 
lapses as a component of a system and organization.  The focus of the theoretical 
frameworks of human error discussed in this chapter was how individuals perceive 
situations and executes actions based on the conditions of schemes (Plant & Stanton, 
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2013).  However, the knowledge and abilities attained through experience or education 
also influence individual schemes.  Most important, human errors do not always occur 
because of an individual’s actions based on the aforementioned schemes and knowledge 
but rather are the result of causal factors presented in the form of a sequence of latent and 
active failures. 
Researchers use the Swiss cheese model to demonstrate the relations among latent 
and actual factors in the occurrence of accidents.  Reason (1990) developed the Swiss 
cheese framework to aid human error investigations in examining the effect of holes in 
the defense barriers of the different systems in a productive organization, including 
unsafe acts, preconditions, supervision, and organizational influences.  Although Reason 
designed the framework to analyze accidents in nuclear power organizations, 
investigators adapted it in multiple domains to investigate accidents and errors.  Despite 
its popularity, researchers who have used the Swiss cheese model found it to be lacking 
in practical application, as it was not able to define failures or system breaks clearly.  As 
a result, Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) developed the HFACS taxonomy to investigate 
naval aviation accidents.  The HFACS taxonomy categorized the causal factors into four 
tiers: unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, supervision, and organizational 
influences (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  The effectiveness and success of the HFACS 
in evaluating aviation accidents promoted its use in other domains; as a result, it joined 
the Swiss cheese model in becoming one of the most used frameworks for accidents and 
human error investigations. 
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To conduct accident investigations, researchers in the various domains adapted 
the HFACS in derivatives to suit the specific needs of their field more effectively.  
Researchers have shown that the HFACS was instrumental in investigating aviation 
accidents worldwide in military as well as in general aviation; likewise, researchers have 
used it extensively in railroad, maritime, and health care investigations (Berry et al., 
2010).  Researchers have used the HFACS to investigate accidents and to develop 
interventions that can eliminate the precursors of accidents. 
Despite the success and acceptance of the HFACS applications, researchers have 
questioned their reliability and validity.  Olsen (2013) noted that the studies 
demonstrating the reliability of the HFACS are limited, which leads to questions about 
the interrater reliability of the taxonomy.  Conversely, researchers in the aviation field 
recognized a statistical significance in the results, along with a significant reduction in 
accidents observed in their domain (O’Connor & Walker, 2011).  Existing data did not 
refute the reliability of the HFACS in aviation application.  Although the use in multiple 
domains is growing, few studies exist in domains outside aviation. 
This review of error investigation literature indicated the limited nature of the 
everyday application of HFACS techniques in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
context.  Despite this gap, human factor taxonomies used in the aviation industry are 
highly applicable to biopharmaceutical human error investigations and can provide a 
significant contribution within the manufacturing context (Konstantinos et al., 2011).  
However, implementing the HFACS presents some barriers that company leadership 
should consider.  For example, organizational factors for developing a just culture are 
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important to create the necessary environment of blame-free principles that will allow the 
required communication (Bleetman et al., 2012).  Creating such an environment should 
result in the better implementation of an error-reduction system. 
A more detailed discussion of the implementation model for the HFACS in the 
biopharmaceutical industry appears in Chapter 3.  The discussion includes the HFACS 
variables and quality indicators presented in this literature review, as well as an 
explanation of how to measure and statistically analyze them to address reliability and 
validity concerns.  Finally, a discussion on how to apply the specific approach to research 
to answer the research questions regarding the implementation in the taxonomy for 
human error investigations in biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes, as informed 
by the literature review, appears in the chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Human error is a part of everyday life, and people are likely to cause errors 
despite precautions to prevent them.  The problem studied was that although individuals 
recognize the potential effect of human error on organizational performance, how 
organizational leaders can reduce the frequency of errors remains unknown.  The impact 
of human error is substantial, as it is the leading cause of accidents and provides negative 
consequences for various industries, including aviation, nuclear power, transportation, 
and health care (Berry et al., 2010).  For this reason, organizational leaders have 
implemented human error frameworks and taxonomies such as the HFACS to reduce or 
prevent errors that may lead to the loss of valuable resources, property, and even lives. 
This study involved a reliability analysis to investigate the utility of the HFACS 
for conducting investigations in biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes.  A 
description of the study design and an explanation for using a reliability study as the most 
appropriate technique appear in Chapter 3.  A discussion of the population and sampling 
procedures, data collection approach, analysis techniques, and steps to ensure the ethical 
considerations for the study also appear in Chapter 3.  The chapter ends with a summary 
regarding the research methodology and a transition. 
Research Design  
The reliability study involved assessing the adapted HFACS for error 
investigations in biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes.  The research design 
included a detailed plan of all aspects under examination (Howell, 2010; Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2013).  The explanation of the research design includes the methodical process 
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that led to valid and reliable results.  I aligned the methodology of this research with the 
main objective of the study, which was to collect data that could provide information to 
determine the utility of the modified HFACS for biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
investigations. 
Members of biopharmaceutical manufacturing industries manage multiple 
investigations as part of their quality systems programs.  Many individuals conduct 
deviation investigations due to the large volume and time constraints needed to maintain 
business demands (Rodriguez-Perez, 2011).  The investigation process entails reviewing 
and approving personnel in multiple functional areas, including the quality organization 
representative.  The involvement of multiple investigators creates a need to minimize 
variations in the data that multiple raters will add.   
Researchers have studied the measurement of variations, especially involving 
multiple investigators.  Measuring the variation among raters involves conducting a study 
where a group of raters must score the same group of data (Gwet, 2012; Feng, 2013).  
This study provided the information necessary for quantifying the extent to which raters 
agree in identifying the human factors involved in incident investigations using the 
modified HFACS.  A low interrater reliability would indicate a possible need for 
additional changes in the HFACS taxonomy or training to the raters (Olsen, 2011).  After 
achieving an acceptable level of agreement, investigators can incorporate the taxonomy 
in the process for conducting investigations in the biopharmaceutical industry. 
Various factors need consideration when designing an interrater reliability study.  
For instance, Hallgren (2012) recommended that interrater reliability studies consider 
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how evaluators will rate the subjects, frequency of rating, type of scale to use for the 
main variables, and the raters’ training.  Therefore, the current study design included a 
specific determination of the type of analysis of the incidents according to the human 
factors variables and the experience and training requirements of the error investigators.  
Furthermore, the experimental design aligned with the sample, data collection technique, 
and statistical procedures. 
For this reliability study, the design was a fully crossed study.  In fully crossed 
reliability studies, raters examine all incidents in a sample (Hallgren, 2012).  In the study, 
both raters examined the entire incident selected for the sample of the specific area.  The 
fully crossed experimental design was suitable for the study, as additional coverage of 
error investigations in the manufacturing environment was possible. 
The fully crossed design was appropriate because of its statistical advantages for 
the study.  Although the fully crossed design required a higher level of effort than a 
noncrossed design, it was more advantageous for the interrater reliability study, as it 
provided for improved and controlled estimates, and it eliminated the need for alternative 
statistics for data analysis.  The additional effort needed to analyze all the incidents by 
each rater was acceptable to facilitate a more sound study.  There was no limitation in the 
availability of incident information, but there was a limitation of the availability and time 
for the raters.  The quantitative interrater reliability research design involved fewer 
resources than a qualitative design, thereby allowing the more stringent sample analysis. 
The methodology chosen for this study is particular to quantitative research 
design.  In a qualitative research study, the objective is to learn about a phenomenon by 
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conducting interviews or observations to find possible themes or descriptions (Myers, 
Well, & Lorch, 2010).  This study included particular variables and a statistical analysis 
to derive the assumptions.  The variables included the factors in the HFACS selected by 
the raters as present or not present.  The conclusions in a quantitative research method 
involve interpreting and deducing the data (Myers et al., 2010).  The two research 
methods also differ in the presentation of the data.  The bias of a researcher may affect 
conclusions developed in a qualitative study (Bickman & Rog, 2009; Creswell, 2009).  
However, in a quantitative research design, the basis of the conclusions is statistical 
analyses that contribute to decreasing the degree of researcher bias.  Other designs 
considered for this study were within the quantitative domain. 
Another research methodology considered for this study was structural equation 
modeling.  Structural equation modeling is a framework researchers use to examine 
relationships among latent and observable variables and the effects among them (Bowen 
& Guo, 2012).  Thus, structural equation modeling serves as a tool to predict the 
influence of latent conditions on observed effects.  Although the basis of the HFACS is 
the theoretical framework of latent and active failure conditions, equation modeling was 
not an adequate design to evaluate the utility for the biopharmaceutical industry due to 
the type of information available in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing incident 
investigations. 
Available information in incident investigation is not suitable for a structural 
equation modeling analysis.  Structural equation modeling latent variables are complex or 
psychological phenomena that require multiple observations of conditions (Bowen & 
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Guo, 2012).  The researchers who collected data in the biopharmaceutical incident 
investigations did not consider either the HFACS or a model for latent conditions.  
Therefore, a study of the utility of HFACS was necessary to determine the reliability to 
allow further analysis of human error in the biopharmaceutical industry with an adequate 
taxonomy. 
Researchers achieve the retrospective or prospective analysis of human error 
using formal human error taxonomy tools, such as the HFACS, based on modes to 
identify errors that could potentially occur during task performance.  The HFACS is a 
well-established and sound error analysis tool for the aviation industry, as well as for 
multiple other domains (Salmon et al., 2011).  Although the literature review revealed a 
lack of studies in domains outside the aviation industry, there is an increase in researchers 
examining HFACS applications.  In this study, the objective was not to make predictions 
about outcomes but to determine whether human error investigators can use the HFACS 
in the biopharmaceutical industry. 
Methodology 
I used the methodology chosen for this study to provide information regarding the 
reliability of the HFACS when used for conducting investigations in the 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry.  The conclusions in a quantitative research 
design involve interpreting and deducing the data (Myers et al., 2010).  This research 
methodology served as the basis to derive conclusions through statistical analyses based 
on procedures that validated the results.  This quantitative interrater reliability study with 
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a fully crossed design served as the research methodology used as the basis to derive 
conclusions through statistical analyses based on procedures that validated the results. 
Population 
The population of the study consisted of incident investigations from 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes.  Members of the investigation department in 
the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry collect investigation reports from all 
incident deviations and maintain a database of the information for ongoing analysis and 
evaluation (Rodriguez-Perez, 2011).  As part of the human error investigation processes, 
error investigators categorize root causes in ties mainly associated to operator or 
procedure conditions.  The FDA requires the retention of such investigation records for a 
period of time (FDA, 2003).  The database contains more than 3 years of investigational 
information on incidences.  I derived the general population for the study from existing 
investigation records in which the investigators attributed the root cause to human error 
in a biopharmaceutical manufacturing company in the United States.   
The study involved collecting information from the narrative documentation 
process of a company’s investigational procedure in its database.  The approximate 
number of human error investigations generated in a year is 100 to 200 for a single 
manufacturing company, although specific information on the total number of 
investigators and number of investigators per company remains unknown due to the lack 
of studies in the area (Rodriguez-Perez, 2011).  I subdivided the data from incident 
investigations from three functional areas or departments of the biopharmaceutical 
production process: upstream manufacturing, downstream manufacturing, and 
70 
 
operational services support, which include materials processes, maintenance, and 
engineering departments. 
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
Interrater agreement and interrater reliability each represent the consistency of a 
particular set of ratings.  To calculate either measure, researchers must obtain samples 
wherein two or more observers have rated the same set of observable evidence (Gwet, 
2012).  To obtain such samples, raters must evaluate a collection of incident reports and 
rate them against the HFACS.  The collections of incidents that raters analyzed were 
representative of the processes that error investigators will use with the modified HFACS 
taxonomy using a sound strategy.   
The strategy chosen for collecting the sample of incidents for evaluation in this 
study was stratified random sampling.  Stratified random sampling is a methodology of 
sampling in which a researcher divides the population into subgroups or strata to collect 
random samples (Levy & Lemeshow, 2008).  Furthermore, stratified random sampling is 
a combination of a simple sampling process with the increased reliability of obtaining 
information on different segments of the population (Levy & Lemeshow, 2008).  This 
methodology was applicable for the reliability study, as the incident investigations were 
of errors in three functional areas of the manufacturing processes.  In addition, the 
sampling methodology allowed the use of raters with expertise in each subgroup of the 
areas under study. 
The subgroups for the study were human error in three functional areas or 
departments of the biopharmaceutical production process: upstream manufacturing, 
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downstream manufacturing, and operational services that include materials processes, 
maintenance, and engineering groups.  Those groups represented the most important 
processes in the key functional areas conducted in manufacturing biopharmaceutical 
products (Rodriguez-Perez, 2011).  It was important to measure the reliability of the 
HFACS in the taxonomy in the most important areas of the domain for the particular 
incidents that were of most concern.  I extracted and stratified the sample of the 
populations in the separate functional areas. 
All the incidents information was in a database containing the investigations of 
the entire facility.  The study encompassed 2 years of incident investigations from 2013 
to 2014.  I collected the information from the incident investigations by conducting two 
separate queries of the database.  The first data query was to obtain the incidents with a 
root cause related to human errors, which were the main interest in the study.  The second 
query separated the error incident investigations by each of the subgroup areas of the 
study (operational services, upstream manufacturing, and downstream manufacturing).  
From each of the subgroups of incidents, I collected the investigation records based on 
the sampling size determination.   
To assess the research questions, the study involved kappa analyses. Viera and 
Garrett (2005) noted that a moderate kappa value of .60 showed substantial interrater 
agreement.  To detect if a moderate kappa value of .60 is significantly different from a 
kappa value of .00 (random chance) with a power of .95 and alpha level of .05, the 
required sample size is at least 40 items (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2013; Sim 
&Wright, 2005).  Therefore, both raters rated at least 50 incident investigations.  The 
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raters assessed for the presence or absence of each of the 18 human factors in the 
investigations.  The study involved evaluating three separate areas in the 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing site, which included 161 incident investigations within 
a 2-year period from 2012 to 2014. 
Recruitment Process  
I did not recruit humans as subjects for the study, as the unit of measure was the 
incident reports collected from archival data.  However, as part of the study, I consulted 
with a group of experts in biopharmaceutical investigations to assess the 
comprehensiveness of the modified HFACS.  The group of experts ran a pilot with the 
modified taxonomy to assess if the information translated correctly to the human errors 
frequently observed in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry. 
The experts for the pilot study were investigators of biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing companies.  The expert group who evaluated the comprehensiveness of 
the modified HFACS taxonomy was from a cross-company collaboration group including 
employees of the world’s major biopharmaceutical manufacturing companies.  I 
contacted leaders of the group to facilitate the participation of a select expert group of 
five individuals to assess the HFACS derivative for comprehensiveness.  The industry 
experts had at least 10 years of experience in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
industry, including human error investigations.  The letter for recruitment of the 
Biopharmaceutical Industry Organization Group members is in Appendix A.   
For the reliability study, I selected a group of biopharmaceutical investigators, 
including two individuals per functional area.  The raters for the reliability study had 
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experience conducting incident investigations in the biopharmaceutical industry.  The 
raters volunteered to be part of the reliability study and to conduct ratings of incident 
investigations using the modified HFACS taxonomy.  Raters of the reliability study were 
senior investigators with more than 5 years of experience with human error investigations 
in the biopharmaceutical industry.  The participants of the interrater reliability study were 
volunteers who had completed a 2-day HFACS training process and had passed a 
certification test in HFACS. 
Participants 
I informed all experts and raters involved in the pilot and reliability studies of the 
purpose of the study and the information they would be providing (see Appendix A).  The 
experts and raters received detailed information of the study and of how I would use their 
contributions.  The first group participated in a pilot to confirm the adequacy of the 
modified HFACS taxonomy. 
The modified HFACS needed assessing to determine if it was suitable for 
conducting biopharmaceutical manufacturing investigations. To evaluate the validity of 
human factor analysis taxonomies, investigators analyzed if they could cover the extent 
of the factors involved in the operations under study (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  To 
examine the comprehensiveness of the modified HFACS taxonomy, five 
biopharmaceutical industry experts evaluated the modified taxonomy for use in the 
domain.  For that activity, five expert members of the Biopharmaceutical Industry 




After I revised the HFACS taxonomy based on the feedback of the expert panel, 
the five investigators used the taxonomy to assess human investigations in a pilot.  The 
main purpose of the pilot was to test the comprehensiveness of the modified HFACS 
taxonomy before using it with the formal study group. The five members of the pilot did 
not participate in the interrater reliability part of the study.  The pilot study involved a 
group of five biopharmaceutical subject matter experts in incident investigations 
evaluating the taxonomy.  The pilot study included the evaluation and feedback from 
industry subject matter experts of the modified HFACS to determine if the taxonomy 
would be capable of measuring and covering the errors found in biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing processes as well as the practicality of its intended use. 
Archived Data 
The data from the incidents selected for the interrater reliability study were within 
a confidential database pertaining to a biopharmaceutical company.  I requested 
permission from company leaders in a letter (see Appendix B).  The information from the 
biopharmaceutical company, as well as all the information collected during the study, 
will remain confidential.  I did not collect information from the company database until I 
received full authorizations from the pertinent company officials.  I used the specific 
information regarding the details of the incidents in the study, as the scope of the study 
solely included the reliability of the modified HFACS measured through interrater 
reliability.  The interrater reliability information did not contain specific information from 
the wording of the incident investigations. 
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Only I had access to the information collected during the study.  The information 
within the premises remained under my control.  I did not share the detailed 
investigational information collected during this study with any person outside the 
company who provided the data from the reliability study. 
Instrumentation and Operationalization  
To conduct the analysis of human error investigations in this study, I developed a 
HFACS taxonomy derivative (see Appendix B).  The derivative consisted of the original 
HFACS taxonomy main elements (Berry et al., 2010; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) in 
combination with the frameworks developed for maritime machinery spaces HFACS-
MSS (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011), maintenance (Hsiao et al., 2013a, 2013b), and 
mines (Patterson & Shappell, 2010).  The modified HFACS taxonomy included 
operational definitions to classify human errors from the investigations.   
Although information from the literature supported the HFACS modified factors, 
a group of industry experts vetted the modified HFACS derivative to assess its 
comprehensiveness.  After I incorporated modifications resulting from the experts’ 
comments in the HFACS derivative, I executed a pilot study with a small group of three 
investigations experts who assessed investigations to test the usability for the reliability 
study.  The raters classified each investigation using the elements identified in the 
modified HFACS taxonomy in any combination, according to the information 
documented in the write-ups and the factors in the different categories.   
To examine the research question and hypotheses, I analyzed the HFACS 
derivative using investigations in biopharmaceutical human errors.  The focus of the first 
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research question was the HFACS derivative as a whole.  The raters classified each 
incident into one or more of the following HFACS tiers: tasks/acts, preconditions, 
leadership or supervision, and organizational influences.  The process involved analyzing 
each case for the presence or absence of the 18 HFACS causal factors in the tiers. The 
operator act tier included two errors and two violations factors.  The seven precondition 
categories were personal readiness, teamwork, technological environment, adverse 
mental state, adverse physiological state, physical environment, and physical or mental 
limitations.  The four leadership and supervision categories were inadequate supervision, 
planned inappropriate operations, failed to correct problem, and supervisory violations.  
The three organizational influence categories were resource management, organizational 
climate, and organizational process.  The raters examined each case for the presence or 
absence of each category. 
The raters analyzed each incident investigation for each of the 18 factor 
categories.  If the category factor was not present in the incident, the rating was 0.  If the 
factor category was definitively a factor in the incident, the rating was 1.  I tabulated and 
analyzed the ratings according to the data analysis plan. 
Data Analysis Plan 
The research questions and hypotheses for this study were as follows: 
RQ1: What is the level of agreement (Cohen’s kappa) between the two 
independent raters using the revised version of the HFACS taxonomy in 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes?  
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RQ2: What is the difference in the level of agreement (Cohen’s kappa) across 
different areas (operational services, upstream manufacturing, and 
downstream manufacturing) between raters using the revised version of the 
HFACS taxonomy in biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes?  
The hypotheses for the research questions were as follows: 
H10: The overall Cohen’s kappa statistic between the two independent raters will 
not be substantial (κ < .61) based on the criteria set by Landis and Koch 
(1977). 
H1a: The overall Cohen’s kappa statistic between the two independent raters will 
be substantial (κ > .60) based on the criteria set by Landis and Koch (1977). 
H20: There are no significant differences between average Cohen’s kappa 
statistics across the operational services, upstream manufacturing, and 
downstream manufacturing areas. 
H2a: There are significant differences between average Cohen’s kappa statistics 
across the operational services, upstream manufacturing, and downstream 
manufacturing areas. 
To answer RQ1, I examined interrater reliability for each of the 18 separate 
factors that comprise the HFACS model.  Interrater reliability helps to determine the 
magnitude of agreement between two raters (Viera & Garrett, 2005).  I assessed each of 
the 18 factors that comprise the HFACS model for interrater reliability, and I coded each 
of the accidents as having or not having each of the individual HFACS model factors by 
each of the raters. 
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Interrater reliability indicated the level of agreement for each individual factor.  I 
coded the individual factors as both specified, only Rater 1 specified, only Rater 2 
specified, or neither specified.  The codes both specified and neither specified indicated 
agreement on a particular factor.  Determining a kappa value involved determining the 
level of agreement for that factor by examining the observed level of agreement against 
the expected level of agreement due to chance (Viera & Garrett, 2005).  Levels of 
agreement ranged from -1 to 1.  A kappa value larger than 0 indicates a higher level of 
agreement between raters than expected due to chance.  A kappa value of 0 represents a 
level of agreement expected due to random chance.  A kappa value below 0 indicates a 
lower level of agreement between raters than what was due to chance. 
I calculated a kappa value for each of the HFACS factors.  The factors included 
resource management, organizational climate, organizational process, inadequate 
supervision, planned activities, failed to correct the problem, supervisory rules and 
regulations violations, physical environment, technological environment, adverse mental 
state, physiological state, physical/mental limitations, teamwork, readiness, decision, 
skill-based, routine, and exceptional.  With 18 total factors, I calculated 18 kappa values 
for each functional area. 
To test Hypothesis 1, I calculated the overall Cohen’s kappa statistic for each 
incident.  The overall Cohen’s kappa statistic represented the average kappa statistic 
across the 18 individual kappa statistics derived from each of the 18 individual factor 
ratings.  I averaged the overall kappa statistics for all 150 incidents and compared them 
against the standard of κ > .60 as a substantial level of agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
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To test Hypothesis 2, I compared the overall Cohen’s kappa statistic across 
manufacturing, quality control, and engineering services using a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) test with Scheffe post hoc tests.  In addition, I calculated an eta 
coefficient (Pearson correlation between a nominal variable and a continuous variable) to 
measure the strength of the relationship between the organizational area and the overall 
kappa statistics (Hanneman et al., 2012).  The calculations of the data analysis proceeded 
using the SPSS data package.  
Treats to Validity 
 When evaluating the reliability of human error taxonomy, it is important to 
consider the elements of content validity.  The modified HFACS needs to be able to 
cover the elements that encompass the human factors involved in error investigations 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  Therefore, content validity of the modified HFACS 
derivative in its utility for investigating the biopharmaceutical process needed to be 
adequate for covering the array of factors in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
environment.  Although this study did not involve measuring content validity directly, the 
study design included elements to ensure the impact to the overall validity of the study is 
not significant. 
The main support of the content validity of the HFACS for use in other domains 
is well established and supported by literature.  Researchers have used the HFACS 
extensively in all areas of aviation, as well as other domains, with successful results 
(Berry, 2010; Stanton et al., 2013).  In addition, multiple reliability studies have shown 
that the content validity of the HFACS taxonomy is adequate (Ergai, 2013; Olsen, 2013).  
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The basis of the modified HFACS used in this study was the literature applications for 
the aviation, mining, and maritime applications.  The expert panel controlled the content 
validity of the modified HFACS and ensured the language was appropriate to the 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing environment. 
Another concern about reliability was using kappa statistics for measuring 
interrater reliability.  For instance, critics of kappa coefficients have identified concerns 
with the dependence on rater prevalence (Kottner et al., 2011).  The main concern was 
the ability of the raters to distinguish among adjacent categories.  However, the kappa 
coefficient served as a good tool in the study, as the validity concern had minimal 
implications in categorized data. 
 Ethical Procedures 
This study did not include subjects and only included unpublished data from 
investigations of a biopharmaceutical manufacturing company.  I informed the industry 
experts as well as the voluntary raters of the purpose of the study and the use of the 
information that they would provide, as well as the integrity of the confidentiality of such 
information.  I explained the purpose of the research in the letter of introduction and 
reiterated that I would not disclose any confidential information.  To ensure 
confidentiality of the company information, the study did not include any personal or 
private business information.  I secured all raw data and kept information under strict 
control for 5 years.  After I received permission from the Institutional Review Board to 





The review of the research methodology and the discussion of the appropriateness 
of quantitative correlational research for answering the research questions and providing 
justification for the research are complete.  The purpose of this study was to investigate 
the utility of the HFACS for conducting investigations in biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing processes.  I identified the study population from investigations of 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing companies in the United States.  The study included 
161 investigations classified with human error as the root cause corresponding to the 
period from 2013 to 2014.  The investigations included operational services, upstream 
manufacturing, and downstream manufacturing.  A description of the method for 
acquiring informed consent and confidentiality, as well as the methods for data collection 
and data analysis procedures, appeared in Chapter 3.  A discussion on the data analysis 












Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the utility of the HFACS 
for the investigation of human error and deviations in the biopharmaceutical industry to 
identify the factors that led to human error in biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
operations.  Determining interrater reliability when evaluating investigations of events 
attributed to human errors with a modified HFACS taxonomy indicated the utility.  Data 
gathered were from the analysis of 161 incident reports from three main areas of the 
manufacturing process of the biopharmaceutical products: upstream manufacturing, 
downstream manufacturing, and operational services.  Six investigators were separated in 
three pairs, for each pair to analyze and rate at least 50 incident in an area of the 
biopharmaceutical process.  The incident reports were rated using the modified HFACS 
taxonomy, and I determined the agreement among the raters pairs to assess the level of 
reliability. 
The data collection and analysis led to answers for the two research questions and 
their related hypothesis.  The topic of the first research question was the level of 
agreement between the independent raters with the null hypothesis to be invalidated 
based on the level of agreement of the Kappa value less than substantial (k < .60).  I 
obtained the kappa values for the three pairs of raters by assessing each factor identified 
in the modified HFACS during the evaluation of the incident reports in the sample.  The 
second research question inquire the level of correlation of the factor values among the 
key areas of the biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes, upstream manufacturing, 
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downstream manufacturing, and services that include support as well as maintenance and 
engineering activities.  
In Chapter 4, I present a detailed description of the study, including the data 
collection procedures and data analyses techniques.  The results of the analyses 
conducted when testing the hypotheses and answering each research question appears in 
this chapter.  The chapter ends with a summary of all the results and findings. 
Pilot Study 
Through the pilot study, I determined the comprehensiveness of the modified 
HFACS to cover the main incidents in the manufacturing processes of biopharmaceutical 
products.  With that purpose, I contacted a group of investigators from various 
biotechnology companies, supplied them with the modified taxonomy, and asked for 
feedback.  The process involved various industry groups, including the 
Biopharmaceutical Industry Organization Group, a biotechnology forum with members 
from the major biopharmaceutical companies around the world.  Information gathering 
took place during a 1-week period.  Five members from the forum assessed the modified 
taxonomy. 
Five individuals assessed and commented on the comprehensiveness of the 
taxonomy.  All the individuals participating in the pilot had experience with human 
factors and conducting investigations of human errors.  The average length of direct 
investigational experience of the participants was 12 years.  All the participants were 
comfortable with the topic of human factors and investigations.  The results obtained 
from the pilot were consistent among the participants. 
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All the participants in the pilot study agreed that the modified HFACS taxonomy 
is comprehensive enough to cover the array of situations encountered in the typical 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes.  They agreed the taxonomy is 
comprehensive and suggested minor changes or clarifications to make the taxonomy 
simpler to use.  The final modified taxonomy used for the reliability study is in Figure 5.  
The main change from the original HFACS taxonomy was the order of the tiers, where I 
changed the taxonomy to be upside down to start the investigations process with the task 
and end with the organizational elements at the bottom similar to the Royal Canadian Air 
Force HFACS (Royal Canadian Air Force, 2013). Another suggestion was to increase 
clarity in the task/actions and leadership and supervision to include the word violation.  
Finally, in the task/actions tier, a pilot participant suggested changing the word decision 






Figure 5.  HFACS-bio taxonomy.  
 
Data Collection Process 
The data collection took place over a period of 1 week.  I recruited six raters in a 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing company in the United States that produces drug 
substance products by typical cell culture procedures including upstream and downstream 
processing.  The raters were employees with responsibilities that involved conducting 
investigations related to human error.  In addition, all the raters attended a 2-day seminar 
on HFACS and passed a test certifying their knowledge in using the taxonomy.  The 
raters also received training in the modified HFACS and the requirements of the study.   
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No discrepancies emerged from the sample proposed in Chapter 3.  The company 
database containing the incident report investigations was suitable to perform the 
stratified sampling.  Three functional areas or departments of the biopharmaceutical 
production process sorted the investigations: upstream manufacturing, downstream 
manufacturing, and services support that included materials processes, maintenance, and 
engineering.  A system specialist conducted a query in the company’s incident 
investigation database for records in which the root cause was human error during a 2-
year period from October 2012 to October 2014.  I randomly selected the records from 
each area, 58 records from Upstream, 50 records from Downstream and 53 records from 
Operational Services for a total of 161 records of incidents.   
The investigations were representative of the array of human error investigations 
present in a typical biopharmaceutical manufacturing organization.  The sample included 
the groups with the majority of the incidents in the main areas of the site.  The population 
was representative from the error investigations that occurred in the biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing process, as it covered a period of 2 years in which the company was 
operating at normal capacity under normal production activities.   
I assigned each pair of rater the groups of records according to their area of 
expertise in which they evaluated the incident investigations.  The raters used the 
modified HFACS taxonomy and the definitions provided in Appendix B to evaluate the 
presence or absence of factors using the information in the incidents reports. The raters 
used a nominal selection process indicating 0 if the factor was present or 1 if the factor 
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was not present.  I captured the information from the raters in an Excel spreadsheet for 
both raters per area evaluated (see Appendices C to H). 
Results of Study  
Descript Statistics 
The raters in the study rated no less than 50 incidents for each of the areas in the 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing process for a total of 161 incidents.  The frequency 
counts for the number of incidents based on organizational area are in Table 2.  Similar 
numbers of incident reports were gathered from upstream (36.0%), downstream (31.1%), 




Frequency Counts for Number of Incidents Based on Area 
Area n % 
Upstream  58 36.0 
Downstream 50 31.1 
Operational services 53 32.9 
Note. N = 161. 
 
The sample size was sufficiently large to comply with the requirements for 
adequate power and alpha level.  As established in Chapter 3, to obtain a power of .95 
and the alpha level of .95, the sample needed to be at least 40 incidents per area (Faul et 
al., 2013; Sim &Wright, 2005).  The sample collected in each of the areas exceeded 40, 
which allowed for the correct power for estimations in the study.   
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Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 was as follows: What is the level of agreement (Cohen’s 
kappa) between the two independent raters using the revised version of the HFACS 
taxonomy in biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes?  The related null hypothesis 
was as follows: The overall Cohen’s kappa statistic between the two independent raters 
was not substantial (κ < .61) based on the criteria set by Landis and Koch (1977).  To 
answer this question, I calculated kappa statistics for each of the 18 factors and averaged 
them together.  The overall kappa for this study was substantial (κ = .66; see Table 3) 
using the criteria set by Landis and Koch (1977).  The kappa value of .66 is above .60, 
which provided support to reject the first null hypothesis.   
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 was as follows: What is the difference in the level of 
agreement (Cohen’s kappa) across different areas (operational services, upstream, and 
downstream) between raters using the revised version of the HFACS taxonomy in 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes?  The related null hypothesis was as follows: 
There are no significant differences between average Cohen’s kappa statistics across the 
operational services, upstream areas, and downstream areas.  To test this, I used a one-
way ANOVA followed by Scheffe post hoc tests (see Table 4).  The overall F statistic 
was significant (p = .05).  Scheffe post hoc tests revealed no differences between 
operations and upstream (p = .82) and between upstream and downstream (p = .16).  
However, the mean kappa statistic for operations (κ = .47) tended (p = .06) to be lower 
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than the mean kappa statistic for downstream (κ = .83).  This combination of findings 
provided support to reject the second null hypothesis (see Table 4). 
 
Table 3 





services Upstream Downstream 
 (N = 161) (n = 53) (n = 58) (n = 50) 
Factor κ % κ % κ % κ % 
Knowledge-based error   .76   92.5   .00   96.2 .48   82.8 1.00 100.0 
Skill-based error   .77   91.3   .00   92.5 .62   82.8 1.00 100.0 
Routine violation   .60   96.9  -.04   92.5 .85   98.3 1.00 100.0 
Exceptional violation   .85   99.4 n/a 100.0 .85   98.3 n/a 100.0 
Physical environment   .66   99.4   .66   98.1 n/a 100.0 n/a 100.0 
Technological environment   .70   97.5  -.02   96.2 .73   96.6 1.00 100.0 
Adverse mental state   .75   93.2 n/a 100.0 .53   82.8   .95   98.0 
Physiological state 1.00 100.0 n/a 100.0 n/a 100.0 1.00 100.0 
Physical/mental limitations n/a 100.0 n/a 100.0 n/a 100.0 n/a 100.0 
Teamwork   .64   94.4   .66   98.1 .66   89.7   .00   96.0 
Personal readiness   .88   96.9 1.00 100.0 .84   94.8   .85   96.0 
Inadequate leadership   .79   98.1   .66   98.1 .66   98.3   .88   98.0 
Planning   .76   93.8   .85   98.1 .75   89.7   .63   94.0 
Failed to correct   .00   99.4 n/a 100.0 .00   98.3 n/a 100.0 
Supervisory rules and 
regulations violations n/a 100.0 n/a 100.0 n/a 100.0 n/a 100.0 
Resource management   .65   97.5   .78   96.2 .00   96.6 n/a 100.0 
Culture   .65   93.8   .58   84.9 .73   96.6 n/a 100.0 
Processes   .12   93.2 n/a 100.0 .05   81.0 n/a 100.0 
Totals   .66   96.5   .47   97.3 .55   93.7   .83   99.0 











One Way ANOVA for Kappa and Percentage Agreement Statistics by Area 
 
Statistic and area n M SD η F p 
Kappa a    .41 3.27 .05 
1. Operations services 11 .47 .40     
2. Upstream 14 .55 .31    
3. Downstream 10 .83 .31     
Percentage agreement b    .43 5.87 .005 
1. Operations services 18 97.27 3.94     
2. Upstream 18 93.70 6.94     
3. Downstream 18 99.00 1.85     
Note. N = 161. 
a Scheffe post hoc tests: 1 ≈ 2 (p = .82); 1 < 3 (p = .06); 2 ≈ 3 (p = .16). 
b Scheffe post hoc tests: 1 > 2 (p = .09); 1 ≈ 3 (p = .55); 2 < 3 (p = .006). 
 
 
Additional Tests  
Also in Table 4 was the one-way ANOVA test for the percentage agreement 
statistics for the three areas.  The overall F test was significant (p = .005).  Scheffe post 
hoc tests found the mean percentage agreement for upstream (M = 93.70) was 
significantly lower (p = .006) than the mean percent agreement for downstream (M = 
99.00).  In addition, the mean percent agreement for operations (M = 97.27) tended (p = 
.09) to be higher than the mean for the upstream area (see Table 4).  Also, I calculated 
only 35 out of a possible 54 kappa scores (18 factors × 3 areas) because SPSS would not 
calculate a kappa score when both sets of raters found no incident to report.   
The paired t tests and Pearson correlations between the four tiers and the overall 
scores are in Table 5.  I calculated the tier score by summing together the number of 
incidents observed for the tier’s individual factors.  Out of a possible 18 factor points, the 
overall mean number of incidents for the first set of raters was M = 1.79 and the mean 
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number of incidents for the second set of raters was M = 1.83.  This difference was not 
significant (p = .44).  The interrater correlation between the two scores was r = .75 (p < 
.001).  Three of four other correlations were all above r > .70.  Paired t tests also 
indicated that three of the four tier scores were not significantly different between the two 
sets of raters.  However, in the leadership/supervision tier (possible 4 points), the first 




Paired t Tests and Pearson Correlations Comparing Tier Incident Scores for Raters 
Tier and rater set 
Number 
of factors M SD r t p 
Task/actions 4   .71 1.42 .16 
First  1.00 0.11    
Second  1.01 0.16    
Preconditions 7   .73 1.14 .26 
First  0.40 0.55    
Second  0.44 0.58    
Leadership/supervision 4   .74 2.16 .03 
First  0.23 0.42    
Second  0.18 0.39     
Organizational influence 3   .46 0.90 .37 
First  0.16 0.40    
Second  0.19 0.44    
Overall total score 18   .75 0.78 .44 
First  1.79 0.71    
Second  1.83 0.72     
Note. N = 161.  r = Pearson correlation.  M = errors per incident. 
 
The number and percentage of reported incidents for each factor for the two sets 
of raters are in Table 6.  The two sets of raters identified skill-based errors most 
frequently (72.0% and 78.3%) as similar numbers of incidents observed for the other 
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factors (see Table 6).  The factors supervisor rules and regulations, rules and regulations, 
supervisor failed to correct problem, and physical/ mental limitations were the lowest 




Number and Percentage of Incidents for Each Factor for the Two Sets of Raters 
First raters  Second raters 
Factor n %  Factor n % 
Skill-based error 116 72.0  Skill-based error 126 78.3 
Knowledge-based error   34 21.1  Adverse mental state   31 19.3 
Inadequate planning   27 16.8  Knowledge-based error   28 17.4 
Adverse mental state   22 13.7  Inadequate planning   23 14.3 
Personal readiness   18 11.3  Culture   19 11.8 
Teamwork   14   8.7  Personal readiness   18 11.2 
Culture   13   8.1  Teamwork   13   8.1 
Inadequate leadership     9   5.6  Technological environment     7   4.3 
Organizational procedures     7   4.3  Resource management     6   3.7 
Technological environment     7   4.3  Organizational procedures     6   3.7 
Routine violation     7   4.3  Routine violation     6   3.7 
Resource management     6   3.7  Inadequate leadership     6   3.7 
Exceptional violation     4   2.5  Exceptional violation     3   1.9 
Physical environment     2   1.2  Physiological state     2   1.2 
Physiological state     2   1.2  Physical environment     1   0.6 
Failed to correct     1   0.6  
Supervisor rules and 
regulations      0   0.0 
Supervisor rules and 
regulations      0   0.0  Failed to correct     0   0.0 
Physical/mental limitations     0   0.0  Physical/mental limitations     0   0.0 
Note. N = 161. 
 
Summary 
In summary, this study included data from 161 incidents to examine the utility of 
the HFACS to the investigation of human error and deviations in the biopharmaceutical 
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industry to identify the factors that lead to human error in biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing operations by assessing the interrater reliability of a modified taxonomy.  
Hypothesis 1, which I used to determine the overall kappa statistic of two independent 
raters using the modified HFACS taxonomy, received support from results that showed a 
substantial overall kappa with a result of κ = .66 (see Table 3).  Hypothesis 2, which I 
used to examine the difference among operational services, upstream manufacturing, and 
downstream manufacturing, also received support from the one-sided ANOVA (see 
Table 4).  The one-way ANOVA and Scheffe post hoc test for Cohen’s kappa, as well as 
the percentage agreement statistics for the three areas, showed a significant F value (p = 
.005).  The results revealed that there was no significance difference between raters when 
using the modified taxonomy.  Furthermore, there was no significance difference among 
the incident investigations from the different areas of the manufacturing processes of the 
biopharmaceuticals evaluated.  Therefore, the interrater reliability of the modified 
HFACS taxonomy was adequate for the investigations examined in the study.  A 
comparison of the study finding to the literature, conclusions and implications for 





Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this quantitative interrater reliability study was to determine the 
utility of the HFACS taxonomy for conducting human error investigations in 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes.  Human errors are a recognized problem in 
the biopharmaceutical industry due to the detrimental implications to products, resources, 
and people.  Although researchers have conducted studies demonstrating the 
effectiveness of the HFACS for error investigations in the aviation industry as well as 
other domains such as transportation, mining, and health care operations, minimal 
research exists on using the taxonomy in the biopharmaceutical industry.  This study led 
to additional information in the area of using the HFACS in the biopharmaceutical 
industry by answering questions that contributed to addressing the literature gap. 
This study included two research questions and an objective to assess the 
interrater reliability of a modified version of the HFACS for biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing process investigations.  I used Research Question 1 to evaluate the 
reliability of two individual raters using the modified taxonomy to examine incident 
investigations related to human errors in three areas of a biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing company.  I used Research Question 2 to evaluate the difference among 
the obtained interrater reliabilities.  Statistical analysis on the 161 incidents evaluated by 
the raters led to me accepting the hypotheses. 
A detailed discussion of the results presented in Chapter 4 with conclusions and 
recommendations appears in Chapter 5.  The analysis includes a comparison of the 
findings with the current literature and an interpretation of significant findings followed 
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by the limitations of the study, recommendations for future research, and implications for 
social change.  Recommendations for members of the biopharmaceutical community, 
including manufacturing and regulatory leaders, also appear in the chapter.   
Interpretation of Findings 
The findings in the study include information that extends the knowledge about 
using human factors taxonomies such as the HFACS for investigating human errors in 
other domains such as the manufacturing processes of biopharmaceutical products.  
Those results aligned with studies in which the researchers demonstrated the applicability 
of the HFACS in various domains for the investigation of errors (Berry et al., 2010; 
ElBardissi et al,, 2007).  Thus, the results obtained in this study supported using the 
modified taxonomy in the biopharmaceutical industry.  I will show how the specific 
results obtained in relation to each of the research questions compare with the literature 
studies.   
Research Question 1 
To answer Research Question 1, six independent raters divided in three pairs 
based on the area of expertise, evaluated a sample of incident reports from different areas 
in a biopharmaceutical manufacturing process using the modified HFACS taxonomy to 
calculate the level of agreement (Cohen’s kappa) between them.  The results obtained 
from the statistical analysis rejected the null hypothesis, as the overall Cohen’s kappa 
statistic between the two independent raters was substantial (κ > .61).  The overall kappa 
for the 18 factors was substantial (κ = .66).   
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Overall Cohen’s kappa values across the tier and factors were all positive, with 
the exception of the areas in which all the raters fully agreed on the absence of the factor, 
meaning that agreement exceeded chance at the 95% confidence level.  Therefore, the 
estimated kappa values ranged from substantial to perfect agreement at the individual 
area level, as well as from moderate to perfect at the overall kappa level.  These results 
were in general agreement with previous studies of interrater reliability for error 
taxonomies. 
Previous studies positively assessed the reliability of the HFACS taxonomy with 
the use of interrater reliability and the measurement of kappa statistics.  As part of their 
HFACS development work, Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) conducted interrater 
reliability studies using Cohen’s kappa statistics resulting in substantial results (.60 to 
.74) according to Landis and Koch (1977).  Furthermore, researchers in recent interrater 
reliability studies obtained similar results like this study where Cohen’s kappa showed 
agreement that exceeded chance at the 95% confidence level with values from .54 to 1.00 
(Ergai, 2013).  However, as previously discussed in the review of literature, not all 
researchers are in agreement with the high interrater reliability demonstrated on the use 
of the HFACS. 
Other researchers have questioned the validity of the studies of interrater 
reliability of the HFACS taxonomy.  According to Olsen and Shorrock (2010), low 
agreement using HFACS-type categories showed lack of consistency, which indicated the 
taxonomy was unreliable.  Furthermore, Olson and Sharrock challenged the quality of the 
execution and the methodology of the studies, mostly due to the lack of independence of 
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the coders.  The discrepancy from the results obtained in this study may be due to the 
quality of the information and the experience of the personnel involved in the 
investigation process.  In this study, the coders were independent, and there was no direct 
relationship or bias regarding the information documented in the incident reports.  
Although there is substantial reliability information around the HFACS taxonomy in the 
aviation domain, the information available in other industries remains limited.  
Nevertheless, the information provided in this study on using the HFACS included 
significant knowledge to improve the quality of the human error investigations process in 
the biopharmaceutical industry, particularly the information from the different functional 
areas of the operations and evaluated using Research Question 2. 
Research Question 2 
For Research Question 2, the study provided data on the difference among 
operational areas of the site.  Especially notable was the level of agreement present when 
comparing the agreement among raters from the areas of upstream manufacturing, 
downstream manufacturing, and operational services.  The analysis of the data 
demonstrated that I could reject the null hypothesis, as the results showed no statistically 
significant differences across the areas.   
Examining the specific variations among the areas revealed some of the values 
were close or tended to significance based on the Sheffe post hoc test.  For instance, 
although the post hoc test revealed no differences between operations and upstream (p = 
.82) and between upstream and downstream (p = .16), the mean p value for the kappa 
statistic for operation services is considered to be tended (p = .06) as it is too close to be 
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statistically significant (p < .05).  However, the values supported rejecting the second null 
hypothesis, as there was a statistically significant difference among the areas.   
These results are in agreement with previous published results in interrater 
reliability studies.  For instance, a study conducted by Li and Harris (2005) to evaluate 
the interrater reliability in aviation accidents using the HFACS showed Cohen kappa 
results between .44 and .83, which indicated moderate to satisfactory agreement and 
showed significant statistical variation.  However, in the same study, Li and Harris (2005) 
found that the percentage agreement was higher than demonstrated by the kappa and 
showed acceptable reliability.  Olsen (2011) reported similar results when evaluating 
reliability among groups, and the percentage agreement was a better indication of the 
reliability of the use of the taxonomy among functional groups.   
I analyzed the one-way ANOVA results for the percentage agreement statistics 
for the three areas to gain a deeper knowledge of the relations among the raters.  Some of 
the individual areas had no kappa values because the raters agreed that there were no 
factors.  For instance, in Table 3, the kappa value for physical/mental limitations 
appeared as n/a, even though there was a 100% agreement among all the six raters.  Thus, 
only 35 out of the 54 expected kappa scores existed.   
The percentage agreement statistical analysis provides an additional assurance or 
perspective than just the kappa value when evaluating the intererater results among areas.  
For instance, from all the areas in the factors assessment, the percentage agreement 
among raters fluctuated between 94% and 100%.  This result compared favorably with 
other interrater reliability results from studies conducted using the taxonomy where the 
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percentage agreement was between 53% and 99% for all the factors (Ergai, 2013; 
O’Connor, Walliser, et al., 2010; Olsen & Shorrock, 2010; Olsen, 2011).  I performed the 
other statistical tests to evaluate Research Question 2 using percentage agreement among 
raters. 
I conducted statistical analysis of percentage agreement among the each of the 
pairs of raters for the biopharmaceutical functional areas and therefore rejected the null 
hypothesis, which validated the reliability of the taxonomy.  For the null hypothesis, the 
overall F test was significant (p = .005), and the Scheffe post hoc tests revealed the mean 
percentage agreement among the areas is not statistically different (p > .05).  The results 
aligned with the reliability studies previously conducted by other researchers confirming 
the validity of the HFACS taxonomy (Ergai, 2013).  Contrasting results indicated the 
level of agreement can vary when evaluating the individual factors and the tiers.  For 
instance, Olsen and Shorrock, (2010) identified lower percentage agreement at the 
individual factor level and higher percentage agreement at the HFACS four tiers.  
Additional testing involved evaluating the result considering the tier levels. 
Additional Tests  
The results of the scores when analyzing the interrater results at the tier level of 
the HFACS taxonomy appeared in Table 5.  The results showed the t tests and Pearson 
correlations between the tier scores.  The results confirmed that there were no significant 
differences (p > 0.5) among the pair of raters at the overall level.  Each rater identified an 
average of almost two factors when evaluating the events.  The first set of raters 
identified 1.79 factors per incident while the second set of raters identified 1.83 factors 
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per incident.  The reliability study demonstrated that there was no statistically significant 
difference (p = .44) for the raters based on the results.  Therefore, based on the results it 
is evident that there are at least two factors from the taxonomy present in the incidents 
evaluated.  Although this part was out of the scope of this study, I observed that the data 
identified some potential elements of causality in the incidents. 
The theoretical framework of the HFACS is the Swiss cheese framework.  
According to the Swiss cheese theory, a combination of underlying factors or causal 
factors comprises the root cause of error events (Reason, 1990, 2008).  Literature 
supports that those factors exist in combination during the error events (Berry et al., 
2010; ElBardissi et al., 2007).  Although I did not evaluate the data of the various factors 
included in the incidents for causality, I will not discard the possibility that raters 
observed the phenomenon identified in other studies as the combination of multiple 
causal factors in the incidents evaluated.  This information is a potential topic for future 
research, as discussed later in this chapter. 
As an additional test, I also evaluated the number and percentage of each factor 
identified by the raters.  For all the six raters the top four factors most commonly 
identified by the raters were skill-based errors, knowledge-based errors, adverse mental 
state, and inadequate planning.  The two most frequently identified factors were from the 
task/action tier of the HFACS taxonomy.  The most common factors identified were in 
agreement with the data obtained from the literature review.  For instance, in the majority 
of the incidents evaluated in the studies, the top factors identified were the error factors 
skill based and knowledge/decision based (Berry et al., 2010; ElBardissi et al., 2007; 
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Ergai, 2013; O’Connor, Walliser, et al., 2010; Olsen, 2011; Olsen & Shorrock, 2010).  It 
was also relevant that the other top factors were from different tiers also associated with 
the elements of causality. 
As indicated before, researchers use the HFACS taxonomy to investigate errors 
by identifying factors in tiers that can interact with each other or prevail in the systems as 
underlying causes.  Extensive literature exists to support the use of the HFACS in the 
aviation and transportation domains (Berry et al., 2010).  More researchers have been 
advancing the use of the HFACS taxonomy outside of the aviation and transportation 
areas toward health care settings such as operating rooms (Catchpole et al., 2007; Diller 
et al., 2014; ElBardissi et al., 2007; Wiegmann & Dunn, 2010).  Those researchers 
indicated that it is necessary to identify the underlying causes of errors to identify the 
effective corrective actions.  Although limited research still exists, the HFACS allows 
researchers to identify interactions among causal factors that can support the 
identification of adequate corrective actions. 
In summary, the findings of this study supported the two research questions 
regarding the adequacy of a modified HFACS as a tool to support human error 
investigations in the biopharmaceutical industry.  I evaluated interrater reliability by 
analyzing the variability between two independent raters as well as by verifying the 
statistical variability among incidents in different working areas of a biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing facility.  Although there were no published studies in the 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing domain, the results of the reliability studies compared 
satisfactorily with similar reliability studies conducted in other industries with the 
102 
 
HFACS taxonomy.  The HFACS is an acceptable tool to facilitate human error 
investigations through evaluating and identifying human factors as underlying causes in 
multiple layers of operations settings.  The theoretical foundation on the Swiss cheese 
framework of causal factors aligned perfectly with the mission of identifying the 
underlying causes of human errors.  The results of the study confirmed general research 
in the area supporting the adaptability and usability of the HFACS to different domains.  
Based on the result of the study, the HFACS taxonomy can be considered applicable to 
the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry considering the limitations of the study. 
Limitations of the Study 
I identified some limitations during this study.  The main limitation was that the 
available information of the incidents was not originally collected using the modified 
HFACS taxonomy.  For that reason, some of the factors identified as not present could 
have been because no one collected or considered the information during the initial 
investigations and not because there were none present.  That limitation existed in similar 
studies conducted in other domains in which researchers used the analysis of previous 
incidents to evaluate the HFACS taxonomy (Berry et al., 2010).  However, the limitation 
did not adversely affect the validity of the study because I was able to achieve sufficient 
statistical robustness.   
Another limitation of the study is the use of Cohen kappa as the main statistical 
tool used to evaluate the interrater variability of the independent raters.  The lack of 
kappa calculation in some factors could also be due to the limitation of the information 
available in the incident documents. However, when all the six raters agreed on the 
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absence of a particular factor, the kappa calculation was not possible.  Although the 
overall Cohen’s kappa statistic for interrater reliability was an acceptable and recognized 
statistic for these studies, additional statistical analysis such as the percentage agreement 
is necessary to complement the study (Hanneman et al., 2012).  In this study, the 
percentage agreement served as an additional test to compensate for the limitations of the 
kappa and to maintain a correct level of validity.  In addition, the overall kappa was 
available for the analysis, which mitigated the statistical limitation. 
Another limitation previously identified was the raters’ lack of experience with 
the HFACS taxonomy.  This is a common limitation identified in the literature and 
represents a concern regarding the validity of previous reliability studies on the HFACS 
taxonomy (Olsen, 2011, 2013).  The detailed training conducted by industry experts in 
the HFACS taxonomy, and corroborating knowledge with an independent certification 
test provided by the expert, mitigated that limitation.   
The final limitation of the study was that it included a single biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing facility, which limited the generalizations of the study to that type of 
manufacturing process.  The facility selected for the study could be representative of a 
large-volume manufacturer of biopharmaceutical drug substances using typical cell 
culture processes in an upstream and downstream design regulated by the general 
government global pharmaceutical authorities.  Conducting future research in accordance 




The findings of this study included the beginning of a new methodology for 
advancing human error investigations in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry.  
However, as indicated in the limitations, further research is necessary to continue closing 
the gaps and the unknowns in the area of human factors and the use of HFACS in the 
industry.  Further research is necessary to expand knowledge on the reliability of the 
modified HFACS taxonomy after conducting incident investigations on real-time issues.  
The research can also expand to determining the ease of use or practicality in such actual 
incident investigations.   
Therefore, further research is necessary to determine the reliability of the 
modified HFACS taxonomy when raters evaluate an actual event.  In a similar manner, a 
researcher can evaluate the interrater reliability of events investigated using the modified 
HFACS.  The study can also involve comparing the results of this study or the reliability 
with other industries using HFACS in a similar fashion.  The limitations also indicated 
the lack of experience with the HFACS taxonomy. 
After implementing the modified HFACS to conduct investigations, raters will 
develop knowledge and skills in the area.  Future research could reveal how the interrater 
reliability of the HFACS changes with additional practice and experience.  Future 
researchers can compare the difference between experienced and inexperienced 




I established that the current process for conducting error investigations in the 
biopharmaceutical industry is lacking depth considering the underlying causes provided 
by the HFACS taxonomy.  Researchers can measure the improvement of the 
investigational process after implementing the HFACS (Berry et al., 2010).  Researchers 
can also determine the prevalence of factors in biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
processes, including what type of association can be determined from the causal factors 
in the biopharmaceutical industry and other industries. The comparison and contrast of 
factors present in investigations in biopharmaceutical processes can be evaluated among 
different geographical regions, typology of products as well as manufacturing processes.  
Future researchers can study and compare the relationships among the factors in the 
various HFACS tiers among different groups of organizations.   
Finally, if better information and higher quality investigations result from using 
the HFACS, it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of that process.  Researchers can 
evaluate the effectiveness of the investigations process after implementing the HFACS.  
That effectiveness can answer the question regarding the quality of the investigations as 
measured by regulatory agencies.  Researchers can also measure the quality of the 
investigation process after HFACS implementation by the effectiveness of the corrective 
actions.  In addition, investigators can use their experience with the HFACS to determine 
the level of quality of the process, ease of use, and level of employee satisfaction. 
Implications 
In this study, I identified the reliability of the HFACS as an alternative to improve 
the quality of the levels of error investigations in the biopharmaceutical industry.  Human 
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error investigations are still lacking, as the use of root cause analysis is neither 
standardized nor reliable between organizations, the main focus is on who to blame for 
the error, and no nomenclature allows the analysis of recurring errors across companies 
(Clarke, 2009; Poska, 2010).  The inability of controlling human errors has detrimental 
effects in the business, regulatory bodies, and society.  The implications of this study can 
help address the adverse effects of human error by providing an alternative to improve 
understanding in the area and establish better corrective actions to reduce such errors. 
Positive Social Change  
Health care costs are a social problem directly affected by the cost and availability 
of medicines.  Human errors in biopharmaceutical manufacturing organizations are a 
problem with a direct impact to costs, production reliability, and safety of industrial 
products (Glavin, 2010).  Part of the social responsibility of companies is to improve the 
condition of their employees, their customers, and their environment.  Errors have the 
potential to create a negative impact on all the areas that constitute a company’s 
responsibility.   
The findings of this study may serve as a tool for leaders of biotechnology 
manufacturing companies to reduce and mitigate the adverse effects of human error while 
improving the effectiveness of their processes.  Implementing HFACS can provide an 
improvement of the conditions of the operators by allowing them to prevent 
manufacturing incidents and safety accidents.  Fewer accidents should reduce labor costs 
of the organizations and the social impact of disabilities.  A better understanding of the 
human causal factors of errors using the HFACS can reduce errors that delay new 
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products needed to fulfill unmet medical needs, prevent the loss of products that can 
create drug shortages, and prevent losses that increase the cost of medicines.   
Methodological Implications  
Given the findings from the review of the literature, and given what I found in this 
study, the HFACS is comprehensive and reliable for conducting investigations of human 
errors in the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry.  Although the findings in the 
majority of the reviewed literature supported using HFACS for investigations of causal 
factors that generate errors resulting in accidents, other research has revealed support for 
use in operational settings (Diller et al., 2014).  However, to maintain the reliability of 
using the error taxonomy and the trustworthiness of future studies, it is important to use 
adequately trained, unbiased, and experienced individuals to conduct error investigations 
(Olsen, 2011, 2013).  Evaluating human factors, especially involving individuals, is a 
sensitive issue. 
Recommendations for Practice 
The results obtained in this study provided an alternative for improving the 
current process of conducting human error investigations in the biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing setting.  Researchers could use the modified HFACS used in this study to 
increase the level of such investigations while identifying better the underlying human 
factor causes that can drive better corrective and mitigating actions.  However, using 
HFACS is new for the pharmaceutical industry and may face resistance.   
Error investigations in the biopharmaceutical industry have involved using tools 
focused on process deficiencies.  The bases of conventional investigation processes in the 
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pharmaceutical industry are process optimization tools and problem-solving techniques 
without considering human factors (McCormick & Wylie-McVay, 2012; Myszewski, 
2010, 2012).  However, humans do not behave like machines and the same factors do not 
affect them.  Therefore, it is important to differentiate process deviation investigations 
from human factors investigations.   
The leaders of regulatory bodies of the biopharmaceutical industry are aware of 
the impact of human errors in the process of drug manufacturing.  Current regulations 
require reviewing records for the presence of errors as well as for executing 
investigations capable of identifying root cause and effective corrective actions 
(Rodriguez-Perez, 2011).  Furthermore, leaders in regulatory agencies such as the FDA 
recognized the negative impact of human errors in manufacturing process deviations 
(Friedman et al., 2011).  However, no clear regulatory requirements include human 
factors analysis as part of the error deviation investigative process. 
Although leaders of regulatory bodies recognize aviation human factors 
techniques as effective, regulatory activity in the area is passive or indirect.  For instance, 
leaders of biopharmaceutical regulatory bodies in Europe commissioned a study to 
evaluate if current regulations prevented using human factor tools for investigating error 
(Konstantinos et al., 2011).  Furthermore, Konstantinos et al. (2011) indicated that the 
regulations are not in conflict with using human factors tools, and the biopharmaceutical 
manufacturers will benefit from using human factors in their investigations and corrective 
actions development.  However, there are no clear requirements from any regulatory 
body on how to use human factor analysis in the investigative process of error deviations.   
109 
 
The HFACS taxonomy may be concerning to industry leaders because it involves 
evaluating the operators, leadership/supervisors, and organizational practices to identify 
latent conditions.  This is different from the current practice in the industry, which 
involves only the operator executing the functions and uses retraining as the main 
corrective action (Poska, 2010).  To establish a suitable process to facilitate the use of the 
HFACS in investigations, the company’s leadership needs to create a just culture that 
fosters open communication in a blame-free environment.   
Creating an open culture in any health care environment would involve a 
paradigm shift for leadership.  A just culture is not the same for all health professionals, 
as it represents a predicament regarding the accountability of errors (Dekker & Nice, 
2013).  The resulting environment will prevent the open communication of errors with 
concerns about negative or adverse implications for stakeholders, including staff, 
regulatory bodies, and the public.  For that reason, leaders of biopharmaceutical 
industries need to collaborate with regulatory bodies to implement the practice of human 
factor analysis tools such as the HFACS in investigations of errors in a just culture and an 
open environment that fosters the well-being of all stakeholders.   
Conclusions 
Every working place in which humans execute functions and operations has a 
high chance for errors.  In the biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry, many 
individuals conduct critical and complex operations in which the opportunities for and 
occurrence of human errors are prevalent.  The problem is that the process used for 
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conducting human error investigations in the biopharmaceutical industry is deficient and 
does not include human factors analysis to understand the underlying causes of errors.   
Researchers developed and successfully used the HFACS taxonomy in the 
aviation industry to investigate accidents considering causal factors.  Researchers in other 
industries used the information gained from using the HFACS in aviation and deployed 
its use in their accident investigations successfully.  Although the literature is limited, 
investigators in the field of health care have been applying the HFACS to investigate the 
occurrence of errors in their operations with promising results (Diller et al., 2014; 
ElBardissi et al., 2007).  Previous researchers identified a gap in the investigative process 
in the pharmaceutical and the biopharmaceutical industries regarding investigations and 
root cause analysis of errors in their operations and the regulatory applicability of 
aviation tools for that effect (Konstantinos et al., 2011).  However, the literature indicated 
the lack of application of HFACS techniques in biopharmaceutical manufacturing. 
In this quantitative interrater reliability study, I examined the utility of a modified 
HFACS for human error investigations in the biopharmaceutical industry.  I designed the 
study to answer two research questions centered on determining the level of agreement 
between independent raters using a modified HFACS taxonomy, as well as the difference 
in the level of agreement across different areas of biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
processes.  Raters examined a stratified sample of 161 incident investigations 
encompassing a 2-year period in a fully crossed experimental study. 
I analyzed the interrater reliability as well as the relationships among the 
reliabilities among areas of a typical biopharmaceutical manufacturing company of drug 
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substance material (operational services, upstream manufacturing, downstream 
manufacturing) to calculate the overall Cohen’s kappa, percentage agreement, and one-
way ANOVA test with Scheffe post hoc tests.  Results obtained in the study showed 
acceptance of the reliability of the modified HFACS taxonomy when used in the 
investigations of biopharmaceutical manufacturing operations.  The results indicated that 
there was no statistical difference (p < .05) with substantial Cohen’s kappa values of .66.  
The results of this study were in agreement with previous HFACS interrater reliability 
studies in the literature.  In addition, the main factor of knowledge-based and skill-based 
errors emerged as the most prevalent in the investigations, which aligned favorably with 
the literature in the area. 
The findings of this study indicated the HFACS can help biopharmaceutical 
manufacturers to decrease human errors and improve the safety and reliability of their 
processes with better investigations and root cause analysis.  However, using the HFACS 
for conducting investigations represents a paradigm change for leaders and regulators in 
the biopharmaceutical industry.  Human factors analysis using the HFACS includes an 
evaluation of underlying causes at the leadership and organizational level that differs 
from the current operator/process improvement mode of investigations.  Industry 
practitioners and leadership should collaborate with leaders of regulatory agencies to 
create a culture of openness and reporting that will facilitate the introduction of 
investigative tools such as the HFACS, which will result in better interventions for 
human error reductions.  The result could be a more reliable and efficient 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing industry. 
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Such reliability and efficiency results from the implementation of the HFACS can 
have positive social implications.  Fewer human errors can promote better management 
of manufacturing costs and increased reliability.  The public expects that manufacturers 
of biopharmaceutical products, in collaboration with regulatory authorities, are capable of 
consistently providing affordable, safe, and effective products.  The public does not 
expect defective and ineffective products with low quality.  As previously discussed, 
human errors have a direct adverse impact on the cost and quality characteristic of 
biopharmaceutical products.  According to the findings of this study, the implementation 
of the HFACS can increase the understanding and prevention of such errors by 
diminishing the adverse consequences of resource waste that can help support the 
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Appendix A: Letter Soliciting Participation in Research Study 
Day Month, 2014 
 
Dear BioPhorum Member, 
 
The purpose of this letter is to solicit your expert input in a research study. I am a 
doctoral candidate at Walden University in the Management Program specializing in 
Leadership and Organizational Change. My dissertation is titled Inter-rater Reliability   
Study of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System for Human Error 
Investigations in Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing.  
 
The results of this study could provide information that increases understanding of factors 
that affect human errors in the biopharmaceutical operations. Moreover, the results will 
provide with additional tools to improve the investigations process in that industry. As 
part of my study I am requesting an assessment of a modified taxonomy that includes 
causal factors of errors. The modified taxonomy presented is a derivative of the human 
factors analysis and classification systems (HFACS) extensively used in the aviation 
industry for accident investigations. I am asking that you provide feedback about how 
comprehensive is the factors identified in the proposed taxonomy to aid in the 
identifications of root causes of incidents associated with human errors in the 
biopharmaceutical industry.  
 
The information provides is strictly anonymous and will only be used to assess further 
changes needed to the proposed HFACS taxonomy derivative. Neither the participants’ 
nor the organization’s name will be revealed in my dissertation.  
 
The results of this research will be made available to all participating organizations 
through the BioPhorum group upon completion of my dissertation. I will appreciate your 
support in considering the evaluation of the forms used in my study. Should you have any 
questions, please e-mail me.  
 





Doctoral Candidate Walden University 




Appendix B: The HFACS Biopharmaceutical Derivative 
Category  Causal factors Definition Reference 
Task/Actions 





Conscious mental judgment action. 
Knowledge, experience and awareness.   
 
Actions were made without conscious 
thinking (Automatic) 
 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003 
 
Hsiao et al., 2013a, 2013b 
 __ Routine 
 
__ Exceptional  
Habitual violations tolerated by leaders 
 
Isolated departures not condoned by 
management 











Operational setting and the ambient 
conditions  
Design of equipment, controls, and 
automation 
Walker et al., 2011 
 




__ Adverse mental state 
 




Conditions affecting execution (fatigue, 
demotivation) 
Acute medical and/or physiological 
conditions (illness) 
Disabilities such as poor vision or lack of 
strength 





__ Personal Readiness 
 
Communication, coordination, and teamwork 
issues  
Inadequate training, lack of rest 
Patterson & Shappell, 2010 
 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003 
Leadership/Supervision 
 __ Inadequate 
supervision 
Oversight of personnel and resources, 
professional guidance, and tactical leadership 
 
Hsiao et al., 2013a 
__ Planned activities Management and assignment of work 
including operator pairing and operational 
activities 
Hsiao et al., 2013a 
__ Failed to correct the 
problem 
When deficiencies are “known” to members 
of leadership yet are allowed to continue 
uncorrected. 
Patterson & Shappell, 2010 
__ Rules & regulations 
      violations 
Disregard for rules, regulations, SOP’s by 
leaders 
Patterson & Shappell, 2010 
Organizational Influences 
  __ Resource 
management 
 
Management of human, monetary, and 
equipment resources necessary for operations 
Patterson & Shappell, 2010 
  __ Climate 
 
Organizational direction including policies, 
leadership structure, and culture 
 
Berry et al., 2010 
 __ Organizational 
processes 
Formal processes by which the vision of an 
organization is executed 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003 
Note.  This document was created by combining the elements from the sources included in the references 









































































































































































































































































1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
38 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
135 
 
40 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
41 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
42 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
43 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
44 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
46 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
48 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
49 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
51 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
52 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 



















































































































































































































































































1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
14 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
15 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
18 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
38 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
137 
 
40 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
41 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
42 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
43 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
44 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
46 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
48 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
49 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
51 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
52 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 



















































































































































































































































































1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
13 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
15 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
16 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
20 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
22 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
23 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
28 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
32 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
34 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
36 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
37 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
139 
 
40 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
41 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
43 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
44 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
46 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
47 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
48 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
49 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
51 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
52 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
53 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
54 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
55 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
56 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
57 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 







































































































































































































































































1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
22 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
23 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
28 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
32 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
34 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
36 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
37 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
141 
 
39 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
41 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
43 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
44 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
46 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
47 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
48 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
49 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
51 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
52 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
53 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
54 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
55 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
56 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
57 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 







































































































































































































































































1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
28 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
31 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
143 
 
34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
41 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
43 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
44 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
45 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
46 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
49 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 








































































































































































































































































1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
26 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
28 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
31 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
145 
 
34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
38 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
41 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
42 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
43 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
44 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
45 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
46 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
49 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 













Walden University, Baltimore, MD                                                                                  2015 
Ph. D. Management, Leadership and Organization Change 
 
PennState University, Malvern, PA                                                                                  2005   
Post Master Certificate, Biotechnology Management 
                                                                     
Turabo University, Caguas PR                                                                                         1991 
MBA Management 
                                                                      
University of Puerto Rico, Humacao PR                                                                          1986 




Janssen Biotech Inc., Malvern PA                                                                     2007 – Present 
Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceuticals Companies  
Senior Director, Quality Operations 
 
Centocor Inc., Malvern PA                                                                                   2003 – 2007 
Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceutical Companies 
Director, Quality Assurance 
 
Ortho Biologics LLC, Manati PR                                                                          1999 – 2003 
A Johnson & Johnson biotechnological company  
Manager, Quality Assurance 
 
West Pharmaceutical Services, Canovanas PR                                                    1998 – 1999 
Contract Manufacturer Organization  
Site Quality Head  
 
Novartis Consumer Health, Humacao PR                                                            1992 – 1998 
Pharmaceutical company of solid dosage and consumer products 
Manager, Quality Assurance 
 
Warner Lambert Inc., Fajardo PR                                                                        1990 – 1992 
Pharmaceutical company solid dosage 
Laboratories Supervisor 
 
Beckman Instruments, Naguabo PR                                                                      1985 – 1990 
Medical Devices Company of biomedical products 




Fluent in English and Spanish 
